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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis prompted in the United States unprecedented
government bailouts for banks, mortgage servicers, the insurance giant
AIG, and automotive makers General Motors and Chrysler.1 The U.S.
economy shifted to financial services and products, and more behavioral
regulation is underway for financial institutions deemed too-big-to-fail. But
federal regulators were incapable in addressing the abuses leading up to the
financial crisis, unaware initially of the scope of the crisis, and inept in their
initial response.2 This is troubling especially when the U.S. Supreme Court,
of late, appears more comfortable with the antitrust function being
subsumed in the regulatory framework.3
Although one can distinguish the financial services industry from other
industries, the crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak
regulation, the lack of understanding of systemic risk in financial markets,
and moral hazard. Policymakers are re-examining fundamental issues such
as the efficiency of markets4 and the role of legal, social, and ethical norms
1

ProPublica, Bailout Recipients, http://bailout.propublica.org/main/list/index.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
3
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkline Communications, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1124
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (when a “regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy
anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the
benefits”); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007);
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15
(2004); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The
American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 636 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).
4
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust
2
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in a market economy.5

3

The financial crisis has prompted calls for

reinvigorating antitrust enforcement in the U.S., toughening antitrust’s legal
standards,6 and breaking up firms deemed too big to fail.7
In reconsidering their antitrust policies, policymakers should return to
first principles.
rationality.

Antitrust policy is built on a flawed assumption of

As a result, antitrust provides an incomplete, and at times

incorrect, account of competition. For the past thirty years, the Chicago,8
post-Chicago,9 and to the extent distinguishable, Harvard Schools10 have
debated over antitrust’s legal standards. But all three schools assume a

Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009) (rejecting assumption that markets
are
generally
self-policing
and
self-correcting),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm; J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: Managing
Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the
Consumer
Financial
Protection
Agency
(Jan.
6,
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf.
5
See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xvi, 238-74; GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 26 (2009); ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE
RETURN OF THE MASTER 189 (2009); Gillian Tett, The Emotional Markets Hypothesis and
Greek Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10-11, 2010, at 7; Rana Foroohar, May the Best Theory
Win: How Economists Are Competing to Make Sense of Our Failed Financial System,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010 (discussing annual meeting of American Economic Association);
John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9; Paul
Krugman, How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009 (Sun. Mag.),
at 36.
6
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on
Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard With Focus
on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm.
7
See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208-22 (2010).
8
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
9
See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 134 (2d ed. 2000)
(“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers”); Herbert J.
Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 259
(2001); Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695 (1995).
10
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
101 (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis).
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marketplace of rational11 profit-maximizing firms and consumers with
perfect willpower.12 Therein lies the problem.
For meaningful change after the financial crisis, competition
policymakers must reconsider three fundamental interrelated questions:
First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals of the competition
laws? Third, what should be the legal standards to promote these goals?
This Article addresses the first question, What is competition. The
question seems so basic that it need not be asked. But as Part I discusses,
no satisfactory definition of competition exists. Some consider competition
as an idealized end state (such as static price competition under the
economic model of perfect competition). Others view competition as a
dynamic process.
Part II explores one reason why multiple definitions of competition
remain. Any theory of competition depends on its premises, the validity of
which may not hold true across industries, countries, and time. Using the
recent developments from behavioral economics, Part II varies one premise
of competition--the relative rationality of market firms and consumers. As
the behavioral economic literature has shown over the past thirty years, and
the recent financial crisis bore out, consumers and firms do not always
behave rationally. Relaxing the assumption of rational firms and consumers
yields four scenarios of competition.
Part III analyzes each scenario of competition and its policy
11

Rationality under neoclassical economic theory has a narrow meaning, namely
individuals are objective, seek out the optimal amount of information, readily and
continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant and reliable empirical data, and
choose, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the best action according to stable, welldefined preferences. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214-15
(2003). Rationality, as discussed herein, does not encompass its other meanings, such as
being fair, pragmatic, thoughtful, compassionate, or virtuous.
12
Humans with perfect willpower take actions that are consistent with their own longterm interests.
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implications. In relaxing the assumption of rational firms and consumers,
the theory of competition extends beyond the current focus on static price
competition in narrowly defined markets.

Issues of systemic risk,

behavioral exploitation, herding behavior, overconfidence bias, the
importance of maintaining trial-and-error feedback loops, consumer choice,
and competitive diversity all increase in importance. Moreover for each
scenario of competition, Part III separately examines the antitrust policy
implications if the government is relatively less or more rational than
market participants. This Article introduces several important challenges
facing competition policy and provides several mechanisms for competition
agencies to improve their policies.
I. DEFINING COMPETITION
A. Common Definitions of Competition
One popular antitrust treatise states, “Today it seems clear that the
general goal of the antitrust laws is to promote ‘competition’ as the
economist understands that term.”13 One problem, the treatise recognizes,
is that economists can have a different conception of competition than
lawyers and laypersons.14 Another problem is that economists have not
reached consensus in defining competition.
The United States’ Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted over a century
ago.15 But antitrust law, Robert Bork observed, “has not arrived at one
satisfactory definition of ‘competition.’”16 This is surprising. The concept
of competition is central to competition policy and economic thinking in

13

PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, I ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION & 100a, at 4 (3d ed. 2006); see also
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON ANTITRUST
POLICY
OBJECTIVES
(2003),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/atcomments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf.
14
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at & 100a, at 3.
15
26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
16
BORK, supra note 8, at 61 (1993).
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general. Competition law focuses on anti-competitive restraints,17 and one
oft-described goal is to ensure an effective competitive process.18 Yet the
concept of competition, economist John Vickers said, “has taken on a
number of interpretations and meanings, many of them vague.”19 Others
agree.20 Most jurisdictions “maintain that their competition laws ‘preserve
competition,’” observed the American Bar Association, but preserving
17

See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89899 (2007) (noting how courts can “devise rules over time for offering proof, or even
presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones”).
18
Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Int'l Competition Network, Report on the
Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market
Power,
and
State-Created
Monopolies
6
(2007),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/Objectiv
es%20of%CC20Unilateral%CC20Conduct%CC20May%2007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ICN
Report].
19
John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3 (1995).
20
United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(“There is no one definition of competition. Economists do not agree over the meaning of
the term nor do they agree how it can be achieved.”); WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 140 (2002),
available at http:// www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm (finding in its
survey of fifty countries’ competition laws, “different conceptions of competition . . .
across countries”); Neri Salvadori & Rodolfo Signorino, The Classical Notion of
Competition Revisited, MPRA Paper No. 22499 2 (May 5, 2010), http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/22499/ (noting that few would disagree with Vickers’ statement); Michael E.
Porter, Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business
Competitive Index 2004, in UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION
CREATING UNIQUE VALUE 64 (Charles D. Weller Ed. 2004) (competitiveness “remains a
concept that is not well understood, despite widespread acceptance of its importance”);
Donghyun Park, The Meaning of Competition: A Graphical Exposition, 29 J. ECON. EDUC.
347, 356 (1998) (“competition has become one of the most ambiguous concepts in
economics”); Jay B. Barney, Types of Competition and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an
Integrative Framework, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 791, 798 (1986) (“Competition . . . is a
concept that can mean different things at different times to different firms.”); Michael S.
Lewis-Beck, Maintaining Economic Competition: The Causes and Consequences of
Antitrust, 41 J. POL. 169, 171 (1979) (noting the “lack, among economists, of a generally
accepted definition of competition”); Paul J. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning
of Competition, 82 Q. J. ECON. 639, 639 (1968) (“probably no concept in all of economics
that is at once more fundamental and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed, than the
concept of competition”); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically
Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957) (noting that concept of competition was long
treated with casualness); STANLEY N. BARNES ET AL., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 318 (1955) (“idea of competition
itself . . . is not so easy to define”).

16-Sep-11
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competition “does not always mean the same thing in different jurisdictions
and is sometimes only one of several objectives pursued under a country’s
antitrust law.”21 The Chilean Competition Tribunal, for example, said, “the
only objective of competition policy is to promote and protect competition,”
but then recognized that “one of the main difficulties is to define legally
what ‘free competition means,’ or to articulate why competition itself
should be protected.”22
Some view competition in its natural setting, a cutthroat fight over
scarce resources.23 But within animal ecology, genetics, and evolution, the
term competition has multiple meanings.24 Antitrust policy, of course, does
not encourage market participants in seeking scarce resources to maim or
kill others.25 Competition should not increase society’s mortality rate.26
Even within the animal kingdom, competition for scarce resources is not a
prerequisite for “survival of the fittest,” the natural selection of species.27
Many view competition as rivalry: “the effort of two or more parties
acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offering the
most favorable terms.”28 Several courts applied similar definitions, such as
21

American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Report on Antitrust Policy
Objectives
(Feb.
12,
2003)
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/atcomments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf.
22
2007 ICN Report, supra note 18, at 8. In 2004, when Chile's competition act was
amended, “the executive and legislative powers discussed whether ‘free competition’
should be defined more narrowly as a right to participate in economic activities, a means of
promoting economic efficiency, or a means of enhancing consumer welfare.” The
legislators, as reported by the ICN, “decided that the meaning of ‘free competition,’ that is,
an effective competitive process, should be left to the Tribunal's interpretation, on a caseby-case basis.” Id.
23
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2006)
(noting that “cutthroat competition” is a term of praise rather than condemnation and
consumers gain when firms try to “kill” the competition and take as much business as they
can).
24
LC Birch, The Meaning of Competition, 91 AM. NATURALIST 5, 6 (1957).
25
Id. at 6.
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id. at 13.
28
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition; BARNES ET AL., supra
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the “effort of two or more parties, acting independently, to
secure the custom of a third party by the offer of the most
favorable terms.' ‘The struggle between rivals for the same trade
at the same time.”29; and

•

the “independent endeavor of two or more persons or
organizations within the realm of a chosen market place, to
obtain the business patronage of others by means of various
appeals, including the offer of more attractive terms or superior
merchandise.”30

Others question this characterization of competition.

Increasing the

number of rivals does not necessarily increase, and can diminish, incentives
to compete.31 “An economist sees competition not in terms of rivalry per
se, but in terms of market performance,” said a former DOJ official. “An
economist would say that a market is perfectly competitive when firms
price their output at marginal cost and costs are minimized by internal
efficiency. This does not necessarily require a large number of rivals.
Where entry and exit are costless, markets can be perfectly competitive
even with only one firm serving the entire market.”32 He characterized
competition as “the process by which market forces operate freely to assure
that society's scarce resources are employed as efficiently as possible to

note 20, at 318 (one conception of competition is “the self-interested and independent
rivalry of two or more private competitors”).
29
Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 1937).
30
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 355 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); see also New England Theatres, Inc. v. Lausier, 86 F. Supp. 852, 856 (D. Me.
1949); United States v. Sutherland, 9 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
31
Avishalom Tor & Stephen M. Garcia, The N-Effect: Beyond Winning Probabilities,
PSYCHOL. SCI. (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502856.
32
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, What Is Competition? Seminar on Convergence sponsored by the Netherlands
Ministry
of
Economic
Affairs
(October
28,
2002)
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm#N_7_.

16-Sep-11
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maximize total economic welfare.”33
Competition, like athletic contests,34 is not always zero-sum. It involves
cooperation through voluntary endeavors among suppliers, wholesalers,
retailers, and consumers.

One can view competition as the voluntary

process society elects to resolve conflicts of interest among its members.35
Competition can be vertical among firms in the distribution chain.
Manufacturers often have a complementary and competitive relationship
with firms from whom they buy and to whom they sell.36 Not surprisingly,
two of Harvard Business Professor Michael Porter’s famous five
competitive forces that impact a company’s profits are vertical:

(i)

powerful customers seeking to “capture more value by forcing down prices,
demanding better quality or more service (thereby driving up costs), and
generally playing industry participants off against one another, all at the
expense of industry profitability” and (ii) powerful suppliers seeking to
“capture more of the value for themselves by charging higher prices,
limiting quality or services, or shifting costs to industry participants.”37
Competition is also normative.38

What we observe as competition

reflects in part the constraints and incentives imposed by the government

33

Id.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (NCAA), 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
35
ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127 (1977).
36
Robert L. Steiner, Market Power in Consumer Goods Industries, in PRIVATE
LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL
COMPETITION (2009); Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (C 31/03) ' V
(2004) (“competitive pressure on a supplier is not only exercised by competitors but can
also come from its customers”)
37
Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan. 2008; Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
2000).
38
Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in
Progress, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580 (2009) (observing how China until the late 1970s
viewed the term competition pejoratively as a “capitalist monster”).
34
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and society through informal social, ethical and moral norms.39 Societies
distinguish between “competition on the merits” and unfair methods of
competition.40 Those terms, subject to different interpretations,41 imply that
competition can be good or bad, based on society’s “generalized standards
of fairness and social utility.”42 Market participants through the legislature,
industry codes, and informal norms set the rules and punishments. At times
competition is considered “ruinous” or “cutthroat.”43 At times competition
with foreign firms is criticized as “structurally and qualitatively unequal.”44
At times competition is curtailed to promote other societal goals.45
Nor is competition always desirable.
39

Status competition (including

DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 60,
123 (2005).
40
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 45(a) (prohibiting
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); Article 6 of Rome II
(Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“unfair competitive practices were not limited to those
likely to have anticompetitive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws; nor were
unfair practices in commerce confined to purely competitive behavior”).
41
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Brief: What Is Competition on the
Merits? 1 (2006), http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/37082099.pdf (noting that
expression “competition on the merits” has “never been satisfactorily defined,” which has
“led to a discordant body of case law that uses an assortment of analytical methods,” which
in turn has “produced unpredictable results and undermined the term's legitimacy along
with policies that are supposedly based on it”).
42
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION ' 1, at 9 (1995).
43
Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by
R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal
and Enterprise Affairs, OECD (1993) (“refers to situations when competition results in
prices that do not chronically or for extended periods of time cover costs of production,
particularly fixed costs. This may arise in secularly declining or ‘sick’ industries with high
levels of excess capacity or where frequent cyclical or random demand downturns are
experienced.”), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3186.
44
JAMES KYNGE, CHINA SHAKES THE WORLD: A TITAN'S RISE AND TROUBLED FUTURE
-- AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA 109 (2007) (concerns over China’s currency being
undervalued, and keeping costs artificially low with poor safety, environmental and worker
standards, and by subsidizing energy and water).
45
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 301 (1945) (“If a State for its
own sufficient reasons deems it a desirable policy to standardize the price of liquor within
its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by permissive sanction of such pricefixing in order to discourage the temptations of cheap liquor due to cutthroat competition,
the Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power and the Commerce Clause does not
gainsay it.”).

16-Sep-11
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competing over conspicuous consumption) can increase envy and misery.46
As economist Richard Layard observed,
We do want the maximum of competition between firms, but not
between individuals. We want a lot of cooperation between individuals,
for one reason above all – that life is more enjoyable that way.47
When referring positively to competition, policymakers often cite its
effects, such as “low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods
and services, and innovation.”48 But the effects do not define competition
itself. The effects, at times, are inconsistent. Higher prices and reduced
output, remarked the Supreme Court, are “the paradigmatic examples of
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”49 But a
divided Court recently recognized that vertical restraints that lead to higher
prices can nonetheless be pro-competitive.50

Manufacturers today can

prevent retailers–through resale price maintenance–from discounting their
goods. At times, increased price competition (for example, intra-brand
competition51) leads to more free-riding, less services and innovation, and

46

Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010).
47
Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116
ECON. J. C24, C31 (2006).
48
European Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings
(2008/C 265/07); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)
(“unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material
progress”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer (“Free and
open competition benefits consumers by ensuring lower prices and new and better
products”), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm; Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Competition Counts: How Consumers Win When Businesses Compete (“Competition in
America is about price, selection, and service. It benefits consumers by keeping prices low
and
the
quality
and
choice
of
goods
and
services
high.”),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/edu/pubs/consumer/general/zgen01.pdf.
49
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
107–08 (1984).
50
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
51
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). A vertical nonprice restraint can potentially and simultaneously reduce intra-brand competition (e.g.,
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ultimately fewer choices and firms.52 At times, greater innovation comes
from excluding competitors from making, using, or selling the product at a
lower price.53
B. Perfect v. Dynamic Competition
Within antitrust, two popular theories of competition are as (i) an ideal
static end-state (perfect competition) and (ii) a process (dynamic
competition).54

Perfect competition, according to some, is “the most

competitive market imaginable in which everybody is a price taker.”55 In
the perfectly competitive market, “buyers and sellers are so numerous and
well informed that each can act as a price-taker, able to buy or sell any
desired quantity without affecting the market price.”56 Between monopoly
and perfect competition are degrees of imperfect competition.57
competition among Sylvania dealers for Sylvania television sets) and stimulate inter-brand
competition (e.g., competition among different manufacturers of television sets, such as
Zenith or RCA).
52
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Louis D.
Brandeis, Price and Competition, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 398 (1930) (observing how unrestricted competition leads to monopoly); Peter
O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation
and Competition 34 (Apr. 17, 2007) (discussing winner-take-all standards war where firms
vigorously compete to establish their technology as the de facto standard),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm.
53
H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (copyright law considers “how much the
monopoly granted [would] be detrimental to the public . . . [as] the granting of such
exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public
that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S.
55, 63 (1998) (“The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been
a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”).
54
Mark Blaug, Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic
Efficiency, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 37, 37 (2001) (noting distinction goes to early history of
economics).
55
http://www.economist.com/RESEARCH/ECONOMICS/alphabetic.cfm?letter=C#co
mpetition.
56
JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 348 (1997); William J. Kolasky, What
Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL.
29, 31 (2004).
57
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
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Others, like F.A. Hayek, dispute this characterization of competition.58
Competition by its nature is not an end state but a dynamic process. The
competitive process is complex and unpredictable. The imperfections and
limitations of human knowledge and the variety of conditions intrinsic to or
affecting markets (including legal, social and ethical norms, technology,
production, and service norms) necessitate against a stable competitive end
state.
The 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines exposed
the divide between static price competition and competition as a dynamic
process.59

The 2010 Guidelines are an improvement over the earlier

Guidelines in recognizing other non-price dimensions of competition.60 But
the criticism remains that the 2010 Guidelines primarily focus on static
competition in narrowly-defined antitrust markets.61 Thus one complaint
endures:

Competition officials recognize the importance of dynamic

competition for our nation’s long-term economic growth,62 but antitrust law
PERFORMANCE 16-18 (3d ed. 1990).
58
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948); see also 2007
ICN Report, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that 10 of 32 surveyed competition agencies
focused on fostering a competitive process that is dynamic in nature).
59
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
60
Compare id. at ' 1 (discussing throughout how market power can be manifested in
“non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product
quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation”) with U.S.
Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6 (1992,
revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (relegating non-price
competition to one footnote: “Sellers with market power also may lessen competition on
dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation.”).
61
See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Next Challenges for
Antitrust
Economists
(July
8,
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf; Jay Ezrielev & Janusz A.
Ordover, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Static Compass in a Dynamic
World?, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2010).
62
Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Competition Enforcement in an Innovative Economy, (June 20, 2008) (quoting
Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory and After, Prize Lecture for the Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987 (Dec. 8, 1987),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html).
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has ossified around static price competition.63
Consequently, competition is ubiquitous and can take different forms.
Market participants compete to secure greater monetary profits. Sycophants
in authoritarian regimes compete to curry favor with superiors. Thus the
issue is not whether competition exists, but “what kind of competition
should exist.”64 Competition can occur (i) on various dimensions (such as
price, quality, service, variety, innovation) across markets (ii) operating at
different levels of efficiency (iii) with different levels of product
differentiation, entry barriers, and transparency, (iv) at different stages of
the product life cycle, and (v) with different demands for technological
innovation.
II. REEXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING COMPETITION AND
COMPETITION LAW
As Part I discusses, competition has multiple meanings. This Part
explores one reason why we have not arrived at one satisfactory definition
of competition: Any theory of competition depends on its premises, the
validity of which depends on the context. Among the assumptions in any
theory of competition are (i) the rationality of the market participants, (ii)
the amount of information they have, (iii) the transaction costs and the
speed of transactions, (iv) the degree to which market participants act
independently of one another and care about the interests of third parties,
and (v) the role of formal rules and informal social, ethical, or moral norms
63

J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Promoting Innovation: Just How
“Dynamic”
Should
Antitrust
Law
Be?
(March
23,
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100323uscremarks.pdf (observed how antitrust “has
historically focused more on static than dynamic analysis”); Michael E. Porter,
Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, in UNIQUE VALUE:
COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST, THE
ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 157 (Charles D. Weller ed., 2004) (“[w]hile
protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by price-cost margins is . . . important, . . .
productivity growth through innovation, where innovation is defined broadly to include not
only products, but also processes and methods of management . . . [are] the single most
important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a nation's standard of living.”).
64
LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 86 (2007).
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in affecting the market participants’ behavior.
This Article focuses on one important assumption, namely the extent to
which firms, consumers, and the government are rational and act with
perfect willpower.65

In relaxing this assumption, one’s conception of

competition changes. Firms can be relatively more or less rational than
consumers in displaying the biases and heuristics identified in the
behavioral economics literature.

Accordingly, our conception of

competition can vary under the following four scenarios:

Firms, Rational

Consumers,
Rational
I.

Consumers,
Bounded Rational
II.

Firms,
Bounded Rational

III.

IV.

As economist Douglass North observed, the “government is not a
disinterested party in the economy.”66 Consequently, for each scenario, this
Part examines the policy implications if the government is either relatively
more or less rational than consumers and firms.
Several caveats are necessary. First, this article simplifies by examining
consumers and firms. One can extend the analysis to the rationality of
intermediaries (e.g., suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers), and firms as
buyers and consumers as sellers of services.

Second, it is an

oversimplification to say that millions of consumers and firms are either
rational or bounded rational. Under any scenario, some market participants
will be relatively more rational and have greater willpower than others.
Bounded rationality and willpower can increase or decrease over time.
65

For the normative and descriptive shortcomings of the third prong of rational choice
theory, namely individuals pursue solely their economic self-interest, see Maurice E.
Stucke, Money, supra note 46, at 907-17.
66
NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 67.
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People at any moment can act “more or less rationally depending on a host
of situational, emotional and other contingent influences.”67
behavior consistent.

Nor is

People can behave differently depending on their

gender68 or situational factors, such as whether they are alone or in
groups.69 Third, firms as institutions can be bounded rational, although in
different ways and degrees than consumers. Firms, at times, can minimize
individual biases, but at other times (such as cults, mobs, and
“groupthink”70) can displace independent thinking.
Finally, in mapping each scenario, this Article first examines
competition using the interaction of firms and consumers, and then
introduces the rationality of the government in discussing the policy
implications. This Article’s baseline is a free-market economy. With a
centrally-planned economy, the analysis begins by examining the rationality
of the government relative to private firms and consumers. With these
caveats in mind, the purpose here is to explore generally how our
conception of competition changes when relaxing one key assumption.
III. FOUR SCENARIOS OF COMPETITION AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Scenario I: Both Firms and Consumers Are Rational
The first scenario reflects neoclassical economic theory and competition
policy today. A perfectly competitive market assumes transparent prices,
highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit, and perfectly informed
rational profit-maximizing producers and consumers.71

67

Price equals

Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions,
TRANSACTIONS (forthcoming Spring 2011).
68
Jeff Sommer, How Men’s Overconfidence Hurts Them as Investors, N.Y. TIMES,
March 14, 2010, at 4 (Bus.).
69
PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT (2008).
70
Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of
Polarized Group Decision Making, in Vol. 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (Mark. P. Zanna, ed. 2005).
71
BLACK, supra note 56, at 348.
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marginal cost. Market forces will deliver the efficient level of outputs with
the most efficient techniques, using the minimum quantity of inputs.72
But perfect competition, critics have long argued, cannot serve as the
policymaker’s conception of competition.73 First, as the Chicago School
jurist Richard Posner recognized, “No market fits the economist’s model of
perfect competition.”74 Second, perfect competition is inconsistent with our
real world view of competition, which over the past century has
increasingly focused on productive and dynamic efficiencies.75 Imagine the
reaction in an Ivy-League MBA program where perfect competition is the
idealized end-state. If true, perfect competition would render the students’
services and future employers’ products as fungible and their high tuition
unnecessary. Instead, for MBA students, competition “is a perpetual flight
from the zero-profit abyss.”76
72

Third, the model, which idealizes

PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 106–41 (15th ed.

1995).
73

Park, Competition, supra note 20, at 349; Blaug, supra note 54, at 39; McNulty,
supra note 20, at 641; HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 58, at 96; JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
74
FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1368 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Perfect competition is a theoretical
concept; all markets are subject to varying degrees of imperfections”) (quoting Austin,
Real Estate Boards, and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1325, 1353-1354 (1970)); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
2
(2007),
http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf
(“real
world
contains very few such markets.”).
75
Vickers, supra note 19, at 7; see also Douglass C. North, Economic Performance
Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 359 (1994) (“Neoclassical theory is simply an
inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development.”);
McNulty, supra note 20, at 649; HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 58, at 96
(“Advertising, undercutting, and improving (“differentiating”) the goods or services
produced are all excluded by definition—‘perfect’ competition means indeed the absence
of all competitive activities.”).
76
M.A. Adelman, Economic and Legal Concepts of Competition, 41 J. FARM ECON.
1197, 1197 (1959); Mary Keeney et al., Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of
Ireland, Research Technical Paper: How do Firms Set Prices? Survey Evidence from
Ireland, 7/RT/10, at 3 (May 2010) (finding that autonomous price setting prevails when
firm considers competition to be absent, the most common approach in setting price is
based on firms’ costs and self-determined profit margin, and only one-third of firms set
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homogeneity in products and knowledge, is far from desirable. Who wants
to live in a world where after providing homogenous goods and services, we
drive homogenous cars to homogenous homes?77
In defense of perfect competition, the Chicago School economist
George Stigler said that any concept to be useful in scientific analysis is
abstract: “If a science is to deal with a large class of phenomena, clearly it
cannot work with concepts that are faithfully descriptive of even one
phenomenon, for then they will be grotesquely undescriptive of others.”78
Under his logic, zoologists could not distinguish among Alaskan Hares
(Lepus othus), Arctic Hares (Lepus arcticus) and Black-tailed Jackrabbits
(Lepus californicus). Zoologists simply would call them collectively as
creatures that hop. Moreover, if a zoologist calls these creatures Alaskan
Hares, she is correct at least sometimes (when a Lepus othus hops past her).
But if an economist describes all competition as perfect competition, she is
always wrong. Perfect competition does not embrace or represent any form
of actual competition. It is akin to the Easter Bunny.
An economic model can assume idealized conditions:

market

participants are rational with perfect knowledge of the conditions of supply
and demand. Under these conditions, market participants “are supposed to
know absolutely the consequences of their acts when they are performed,
and to perform them in the light of the consequences.”79 But since perfect
price
primarily
by
following
that
of
their
closest
competitor),
http://www.centralbank.ie/data/TechPaperFiles/prices_rtpMay10.pdf. For an excellent
recent discussion of this, see Deven R. Desai & Spencer Weber Waller, Brands,
Competition and the Law (Feb. 1, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545893.
77
One example was the Cultural Revolution in China where “[a]ny form of personal
taste in clothing was out of bounds—women wore uniformly flat heels and most people
donned Red Guard-style green uniform jackets, baggy trousers and caps, with a badge of
the Chairman [Mao] on the tunic pocket.” FENBY, supra note 159, at 457; see also
RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION 116
(2006).
78
Stigler, supra note 20, at 17.
79
Id. at 12 (quoting FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)).
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competition is neither descriptive nor normative, it is of little utility in
dealing with day-to-day competition policy issues.
The next gradation is to assume rational actors with incomplete
knowledge. Some information is unobtainable. Other information, while
obtainable, is too costly to procure.80 In this market economy, the Austrian
School economist Ludwig von Mises observed, rational consumers, not
firms, should be supreme.

In their purchasing behavior, consumers

ultimately determine “what should be produced and in what quantity and
quality.”81 Mises, in his belief of consumer sovereignty, was skeptical
about the evils of private monopolies: Rational consumers with willpower
often can take care of themselves in the marketplace. But this is not always
true.82 Imperfect information and informational asymmetries, for example,
can lead to “lemon” markets where dishonest dealers for goods or services
drive out honest dealers,83 and thereby inhibit innovation.
The trickier aspect, as the next three scenarios address, is the descent to

80

William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers 60 (“Rational consumers and
producers will invest in becoming informed only up until the point where the marginal cost
of
information
equals
its
marginal
value.”),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11254.htm#N_1_.
81
MISES, supra note 64, at 17.
82
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992); Queen
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 446 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Kodak is
merely a concession to fact that markets do not always work perfectly, and sometimes, but
not always, these [information] imperfections can create sufficient market power to justify
possible antitrust liability.”); see also Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It On The Chin:
Imperfect Information Could Play A Crucial Role In The Post-Kodak World, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 193, 195 (1993) (“Another important lesson of Kodak is that imperfect
information can be a crucial factor in defining relevant markets.”).
83
FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) (“The honest manufacturer's
business may suffer, not merely through a competitor's deceiving his direct customer, the
retailer, but also through the competitor's putting into the hands of the retailer an unlawful
instrument, which enables the retailer to increase his own sales of the dishonest goods,
thereby lessening the market for the honest product.”); George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 495
(1970) (cost of dishonesty includes “loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of
existence”).
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bounded rational actors with imperfect willpower, who act with incomplete
knowledge. Markets, where many participants have bounded rationality
and willpower, can lead to additional undesirable outcomes.
1. Scenario I’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is Rational
A trinity of rational firms, consumers and government paradoxically can
justify either limited government or a centrally-planned economy.84 As
Stigler observed, a “perfect market may also exist under monopoly.”85
Logically monopolies can be private or government enterprises.

If the

latter, a state planner could model scenarios using the hypothetical profitmaximizer and centrally plan a similar outcome. Because rational profitmaximizing behavior is predictable, a temptation exists to nudge
competition closer to perfect competition under “the guiding hand of some
elite corps of governmental and non-governmental policy-makers.”86
On the other hand, the stronger the presumption of rationality, the
laissez-faire argument goes, the more likely the market is perceived in
becoming efficient, the less need for governmental regulation.87 Generally,
with rational market participants acting with the optimal amount of
information in markets with no negative externalities, there is little for the
government to do.88 Transactions are presumably mutually beneficial as
market participants contract to further their interests.

The government

perhaps can facilitate competition by reducing the market participants’
84

See also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC
CALAMITIES 59 (2009) (discussing Oskar Lange’s same observations on a centrallyplanned economy and perfect competition).
85
Stigler, supra note 20, at 14.
86
HM Blake & WK Jones, In Defense of Antitrust 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 378
(1965).
87
Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 485 n.23
(3d Cir. 1992) (“Most of the work of ‘Chicago School’ theorists has centered on the
general proposition that significant economic harm cannot occur (and hence the antitrust
laws should not interfere) in competitive markets.”); Michael A. Salinger, Behavioral
Economics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2010,
at 68.
88
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, 69.
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transaction costs (such as providing a model contract and well-functioning
judiciary system) or by lowering the participants’ search and information
costs (such as combating fraud).89

But the stronger the rationality

presumption, the more likely the government, subject to rent-seeking, is
perceived to impede the path toward allocative efficiency.90
Even in Scenario I, it does not follow that the government always does
little. First, the government must address the commonly identified types of
market failure under neo-classical economic theory, such as (i) the sustained
exercise of market power;91 (ii) externalities;92 (iii) public goods;93 and (iv)
significant informational asymmetries or uncertainty.94

So the rational

government can increase price transparency (by restricting competitors’
concerted efforts to reduce it or mandating public disclosures), internalize
negative externalities (such as imposing on polluters a carbon tax),
prosecute anticompetitive restraints of trade (such as price-fixing cartels or
monopolist’s efforts to unfairly increase rivals’ costs or deter entry), and
enjoin mergers to monopoly.
Second, competitive markets do not always yield the best or desired
outcome. “It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics

89

Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a
Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010).
90
See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, In Honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates
Clark Medal, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 182 n.7 (1993) (“there is no market failure so bad that
the U.S. government and political process could not do even worse”).
91
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 126.
92
BLACK, supra note 56, at 168 (where the “cost or benefit arising from any activity
which does not accrue to the person or organization carrying on the activity”); A. C. PIGOU,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1962).
93
Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958)
(whereby the payers for the goods cannot exclude the non-payers from consuming (or
benefitting) from the goods (e.g., national defense)).
94
http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=M#marketfail
ure; see also François Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 847, 849 (2004).
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that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.”95
Unbridled capitalism, Professors Akerlof and Shiller write, “does not
automatically produce what people really need; it produces what they think
they need, and are willing to pay for.”96 Competition can maximize output
of products that eventually wipe out the economy.97
Third, the government must address behavior that is individually
rational but collectively irrational.98 In examining the financial crisis, for
example, Posner described how rational self-interested behavior of “lawabiding financiers and consumers can precipitate an economic disaster.”99
Self-interest, for Posner, is a private virtue in that competition drives
businesses to profit maximization, which drives economic progress.100 But
competitive self-interested behavior, at times, is a public vice.

An

overleveraged financial institution can ignore the small probability that its
risky conduct in conjunction with its competitors’ risky conduct may bring
down the entire economy. Each firm in pursuing its self-interest will incur
greater leverage to maximize profits.101

So even for rational-choice

theorists like Posner, the government must serve as a countervailing force to
such self-interested rational private behavior by better regulating financial
institutions.102

95

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 36 (“It is not a correct
deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates
in the public interest.”); STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 273.
96
AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 5, at 26.
97
Id.; see also Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008,
at A01 (noting several Clinton and Bush administrations officials’ opposition to regulation
of derivatives).
98
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 139-50, 309.
99
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 107 (2009); see also id. at 111-112; CASSIDY, supra note 84, at
209-17.
100
POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 99, at 107.
101
See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 221-27.
102
POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 99, at 107.
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2. Scenario I’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is Bounded
Rational
Rational firms and consumers often will be worse off when a meddling
bounded rational government seeks to regulate their competitive behavior.
Market forces invariably would provide a more efficient or timely
solution.103
But one first must inquire why the government is less rational than the
market participants. One theory is dispositional: The government attracts
bounded rational employees, namely, as Mises called them, those unfit to
serve their fellow citizens, but who want to rule them.104 But this assumes
that civil servants’ disposition differs from consumers’ and firms’.
Government workers, however, are also consumers (and former employees
in private firms). Consequently, it is unlikely that civil servants are more
rational in their private transactions (or prior jobs) than in their government
offices.
A second theory is that the bounded rationality is situational. Market
forces provide greater incentives for private firms and consumers to
improve their willpower and rationality.105 In their work decisions, civil
servants, in contrast, have weaker incentives to avoid mistakes because of
political myopia, the lack of direct accountability to voters, and regulatory
capture.

Under this theory, attracting business executives to oversee

government agencies, and promoting a revolving door between the
government and private sector will not eliminate bounded rationality, as the
situational forces remain. The bureaucracy is not structured to experiment
103

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
124 (2005) (“markets generally work well when left alone, [and] intervention is justified
only in the relatively few cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more
cheaply, or more quickly than the market can fix itself”).
104
MISES, supra note 64, at 75.
105
Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism & Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 140–41,
144–46 (2006) (modeling how consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors that
directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats).
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for the purpose of maximizing profits, but for the employees, consistent
with the rule of law, to “obey rules and regulations established by a superior
body.”106
Logically under this scenario, a bounded rational government should not
be problematic for competition policy.

There exists the risk that the

government, captured by powerful special interests, impedes competition.
But rational citizens, recognizing this risk, would rely on structural, rather
than behavioral, safeguards to prevent the concentration of power in either
the government or marketplace.107

Accordingly the demand for

governmental antitrust services would diminish to the instances of sustained
market failure, which market forces cannot correct. The bounded rational
government would undertake measures (preferably structural) to prevent (or
remedy) these market failures, under the careful guidance of rational voters.
Otherwise, rational market participants in a well-functioning democracy
would increasingly rely on market forces for the solution.
B. Scenario II: Rational Firms and Bounded Rational Consumers
Here rational firms can compete to exploit or help consumers with
bounded rationality and willpower. Consumers with bounded willpower
sacrifice their long-term interests (such as increased savings) for immediate
consumption (and increased debt),108 and display time-inconsistent
preferences.109 When the activity involves immediate costs and delayed

106

MISES, supra note 64, at 55.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger
Remedies (Oct. 2004) (structural remedies in merger cases are preferred as “they are
relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement in the
market”), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf; Louis D. Brandeis,
Scientific Management and Trusts, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 386 (1930) (observing how accepting mergers to monopolies with behavioral
safeguards is like “surrendering liberty and substituting despotism with safeguards”).
108
Ned Welch, A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics, MCKINSEY Q. (Feb.
2010).
109
Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate & Delayed
Monetary Rewards, SCIENCE, Oct. 13, 2004, at 503, 504 (noting how if someone offered
107
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benefits (e.g., exercising, studying), consumers procrastinate.110 When the
activity involves immediate benefits and delayed costs, consumers find it
harder to delay gratification.111
Behavioral economics, commented one of its pioneers, uses scientific
methods to explore human behavior already known to “advertisers and
used-car salesmen.”112 Rational firms manipulate consumption decisions by
•

using framing effects and changing the reference point, such that
the price change is viewed as a discount, rather than a
surcharge;113

•

anchoring consumers to an artificially high suggested retail
price, from which bounded rational consumers negotiate;114

$10 today versus $11 tomorrow, person would be tempted to choose the former; whereas if
present choice involved a distant payoff ($10 in a year from now versus $11 in a year and a
day from now), same person would likely choose the latter).
110
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
103 (1999) (discussing welfare implications of sophisticated person, who knows exactly
what her future self's preferences will be, and naïve person, who believes her future self’s
preferences will be identical to her current self's, not realizing that as she gets closer to
executing decisions her tastes will change).
111
Id. at 110 (using example of seeing a mediocre film this weekend rather than
waiting to see a better film released several weeks later).
112
GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY
MISTAKES AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 23 (1999) (quoting Amos Tversky).
113
The way the choice is framed—such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss—can
significantly impact the outcome of the consumers’ choice. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449,
1458 (2003). Consumers may be less concerned with the elimination of a discount than a
price increase (although both have the same net effect). Thus deviations from the
perceived reference point may be marked by asymmetric price elasticity: consumers may
be more sensitive to (and angry about) price increases than when the manufacturer
eliminates a discount or does not reduce prices during periods of deflation.
114
In one experiment, MBA students put down the last 2 digits of their social security
number (e.g., 14). The students then participants monetized it (e.g., $14), and then
answered for each bidded item Yes or No if they would pay that amount for the item. The
students then stated the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each auctioned
product. Students with the highest ending SSN (80-99) bid the highest and those with the
lowest SSN (1-20) bid the lowest, and those with highest-ending SSN bid 216 to 346
percent higher than students with low-end SSNs. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 25-28 (2008).
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adding decoy options (such as a restaurant’s adding a higher
priced wine) to make the other options appear relatively less
expensive;115

•

using the sunk cost fallacy to remind bounded rational
consumers of the financial commitment they already made to
induce them to continue paying installments on an item, whose
value is less than the remainder of payments;

•

using the availability heuristic116 to drive purchases, such as an
airline travel insurer using an emotionally salient death (from
‘‘terrorist acts’’) rather than a death from ‘‘all possible
causes;’’117

•

taking advantage of the focusing illusion in advertisements (i.e.,
consumers

predicting

greater

personal

happiness

from

consumption of the advertised good and not accounting one’s
adaptation to the new product);118
•

giving the impression that their goods and services are of better
quality because they are higher priced;119 and

115

Similarly, people rarely choose things in absolute terms, but instead based on their
relative advantage to other things. Id. at 2. As Ariely discusses, by adding a third more
expensive choice, for example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive
second choice. Id. MIT students, in one experiment, were offered three choices for the
Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for $59 (sixteen students); (ii) printonly subscriptions for $125 (no students); and (iii) print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125
(eighty-four students). Id. at 5. When the “decoy” second choice (print-only subscriptions)
was removed and only the first and third options were presented, the students did not react
similarly. Id. at 5–6. Instead sixty-eight students opted for Internet-only subscription for
fifty-nine dollars (up from sixteen students) and only thirty-two students chose print-andInternet subscriptions for $125 (down from eighty-four students). Id. at 5–6.
116
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1127 (noting situations where people assess the
“frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind”).
117
E.J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35–51 (1993).
118
See supra note .
119
Ariely for example conducted several experiments that revealed the power of higher
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seeking to avoid price competition through branding.120

Rational credit card companies, as one example, can capitalize on this
bounded rationality and willpower in two ways: First, they can compete in
ways to encourage consumers to charge more (and maximize fees for the
banks).121

Competition profits the rational firms but leaves consumers

increasingly miserable with greater debt.

Second, rational credit card

companies can compete in helping consumers achieve their long-term
interests by providing them with commitment devices.

Sophisticated

prices. ARIELY, supra note 114, at 181-86. In one experiment, nearly all the participants
reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at $2.50 per dose; when the placebo was
discounted to 10 cents per dose, only half of the participants experienced less pain. Id. at
182-83. Similarly, MIT students who paid regular price for the “SoBe Adrenaline Rush”
beverage reported less fatigue than the students who paid one-third of regular price for the
same drink. Id. at 184-85. SoBe Adrenaline Rush beverage was next promoted as energy
for the students’ mind, and students after drinking the placebo, had to solve as many word
puzzles within 30 minutes. Students who paid regular price for the drink got on average 9
correct responses, versus students who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on
average 6.5 questions right. Id. at 185-86. Similarly, according to researchers at the
Stanford Graduate School of Business and the California Institute of Technology, “if a
person is told he or she is tasting two different wines—and that one costs $5 and the other
$45 when they are, in fact, the same wine—the part of the brain that experiences pleasure
will become more active when the drinker thinks he or she is enjoying the more expensive
vintage.” http://news-service.stanford.edu/pr/2008/pr-wine-011608.html; see also Jonathan
D. Glater & Alan Finder, In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2006 (discussing how Ursinus College, believing it was losing applicants because of its
low tuition, raised its tuition and fees 17.6 percent in 2000 (but offered more financial aid),
and
received
nearly
200
more
applications
the
following
year),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/education/12tuition.html?pagewanted=print.
120
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1054-58 (1991). A famous antitrust
example is Clorox, whose bleach is chemically indistinguishable from rival brands. FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Nonetheless, Clorox invested millions of
dollars in promoting its brand of bleach, and often charged a higher price for its bleach.
One would think that a market, where one company sells a fungible chemically
indistinguishable product at a price premium, would be attractive for potential entrants.
But Procter & Gamble sought to purchase Clorox rather than enter the liquid bleach market
independently. And Clorox bleach, according to the company website, remains today the
U.S.
industry
leader
with
64
percent
of
sales.
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/CLX/895785564x0x319009/61002338-3AE940B6-8B3A-592193C6364E/FactSheet_2009_Final.pdf.
121
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 56
(2008) (“data on credit choice and use show that consumer mistakes cost hundreds of
dollars a year per consumer”).
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consumers, recognizing their bounded willpower, can demand commitment
devices.122

Every day, for example, people have part of their salaries

automatically deducted into separate investment accounts, hire personal
trainers to ensure they exercise, and set their clocks slightly fast. Banks
accordingly can offer credit cards with commitment devices to enable
consumers to save more. Consumers in their dispassionate state can elect to
cap subsequent credit card purchases for certain categories of goods or
services (e.g., limiting spending on Starbucks coffee to $5 per week).123
Why wouldn’t rational firms always exploit consumers? One factor is
rational firms’ ability to identify consumers with weaker rationality and
willpower for certain decisions.

Consumers can make better decisions

when they have greater experience, have good feedback on earlier errors, or
rely on salient information.124 Thus identifying instances where bounded
rationality can be exploited is a business unto itself.125 Rational firms can
target bounded rational consumers by offering to help them with their
earlier problems, such as selling their time shares, preventing home
foreclosures, or improving their credit rating.
At times exploiting irrationality benefits society. Rational firms can
dampen investors’ speculation (e.g., buying a company’s stock on the hope
that past price increases will continue with future price increases). The
interaction of people each of whom possesses partial knowledge can yield
122

O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 110, at 103-24; David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 444-45 (1997).
123
Ron Lieber, Your Money: Your Card Has Been Declined, Just as You Wanted, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/your-money/credit-and-debitcards/14money.html?src=me&ref=business.
124
John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J.
ECON. 41, 41 (2003).
125
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at 23-24. Credit rating agency Equifax, for
example, advertises “ ‘advanced profiling techniques’ to identify people who show a
‘statistical propensity to acquire new credit’ within [ninety] days.” Brad Stone, Banks
Mine Data and Woo Troubled Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/22target.html?_r=1.
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valuable information, such as a remarkably accurate prediction of an event
in prediction markets.126 Rational investors can exploit irrationality, as
these predictions markets have a defined event (e.g., the winner of the U.S.
presidential elections) and end date when bets are settled.127
But rational firms, even after identifying bounded rational consumers,
cannot always exploit them.

Consumers, recognizing their bounded

rationality, can turn to rational advisors or consumer advocates (such as
Consumers Reports).

Many markets, unlike prediction markets, lack a

defined end-point. A rational investor could “short” a company’s stock to
profit when the stock price declines.128

But the rational trader cannot

determine when the speculation bubble will burst. Rational traders, due to
investor pressure, can be subject to short-term horizons, and follow the herd
for short-term gains.129 Rational traders may also find it more profitable to
devise products to facilitate, rather than combat, speculation.130
Scenario II competition presents other forms of market failure. One is
systemic behavioral exploitation.131 In competitive markets, one expects
126

Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social
Behavior?, SCIENCE, Jan. 6, 2006, at 47, 52; see also HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note
58, at 91.
127
Id.
128
The Fool FAQ, Shorting Stocks (“An investor who sells stock short borrows shares
from a brokerage house and sells them to another buyer. Proceeds from the sale go into the
shorter's account. He must buy those shares back (cover) at some point in time and return
them to the lender.”), http://www.fool.com/foolfaq/foolfaq0033.htm.
129
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, in II ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 81, 92 (Richard H. Thaler ed. 2005); see also CASSIDY, supra note
84, at 177-81; James Mackintosh, Decoding the Psychology of Trading, FIN. TIMES, July
17-18, 2010, at 15 (discussing how hedge fund seeks to exploit investors’ bounded
rationality by monitoring investor sentiments in the press).
130
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 182-84; ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 172 (2002) (citing several examples, including
future contracts on tulips during the Tulipmania in the 1630s).
131
Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 17-18 (2010) (discussing how behavioral
exploitation may produce longer-lasting consumer harm). Prof. Huffman’s article
prompted an interesting roundtable discussion among competition law lawyers,
economists, and policy officials. Antitrust Marathon IV: With Authority -- A discussion led
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rational firms to inform bounded rational consumers of other firms’
attempts to exploit them. Providing this information is another facet of
competition: Trust us, we won’t exploit you.132 But too frequently rather
than compete to build consumers’ trust in their business, competitors
engage in similar exploitation.133
Rational firms can compete in finding cleverer ways to attract and
exploit bounded rational consumers companies. As the U.K.’s Office of
Fair Trading recently experimented, firms can jointly manipulate consumer
consumption behavior and leave them worse off under five common price
frames: (i) “drip pricing”, where a lower price is initially disclosed to the
consumer and additional charges are added as the sale progresses; (ii)
“sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off an inflated regular price
by Philip Marsden and Spencer Weber Waller, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1-127 (2010).
132
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) (“If the
structure of the market is such that there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we
need not be especially concerned with how firms behave because the presence of effective
competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit consumers.”) (quoting
George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 808 (1992)).
133
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474 n.21
(1992) (noting that “in an equipment market with relatively few sellers, competitors may
find it more profitable to adopt Kodak’s service and parts policy than to inform the
consumers”); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 308, 313 (1934) (finding that
while competitors “reluctantly yielded” to the challenged practice to avoid loss of trade to
their competitors, a “trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest practice, force his competitors
to choose between its adoption or the loss of their trade”); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120
F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941) (Ford following industry leader General Motors in advertising a
deceptive six-percent financing plan); Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (Spring
2010); Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition
Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145, 150 (2010); Huffman, supra note 131.
Antitrust scholar Robert Steiner, who was also the former president of the Kenner Products
toy company, described his concerns about the industry self-regulation of toy commercials
in the 1960s and 1970s. Originally favoring industry self-policing, he feared the greater
anticompetitive consequences of deceptive advertising. Absent regulation, some toy
manufacturers would air deceptive ads, which would pull down the toy industry. Unless
his company matched “the exaggerations and sometimes the outright deceptions of certain
competitors, our commercials might not be exciting enough to move our toys off the shelf.”
He foresaw bad commercials driving out the good ones, rendering TV advertising
relatively ineffective. Robert L. Steiner, Double Standards in the Regulation of Toy
Advertising, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1988).
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(was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing” (e.g., three-for-two offers), where
the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,” where sellers
promote special deals with only a limited number of goods available at the
discounted price; and (v) “time limited offers,” where the special price is
available for a short period.134 The OFT experiment found drip pricing and
time-limited offers particularly detrimental. Not surprisingly one sees such
exploitive “drip pricing” for airline tickets,135 car rentals,136 and prepaid
telephone calling cards.137
To exploit consumers, rational firms can compete in ways to reduce
price transparency and increase the complexity of their products (or product
terms).138 Take credit cards as one example. A single credit card account
134

Office of Fair Trading, The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision Making
(May 2010), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf.
135
The airlines are clever in their surcharges for pieces and weight of luggage, phone
reservation fees, meals, beverages, headsets, extra leg room, etc. These extra fees often are
not quoted in the initial price displayed to customers, but later when consumers are
completing their purchase. Jad Mouawad & Claire Cain Miller, Search for Low Airfares
Gets More Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at B1; Alex Altman & Kate Pickert,
New Airline Surcharge: A Bag Too Far?, TIME, May 22, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1808804,00.html.
136
In re Dollar Rent-A-Car, 116 F.T.C. 255 (1993) (requiring Dollar to disclose to
consumers in its ads the existence of any mandatory fuel charges, airport surcharges or
other charges not reasonably avoidable by consumers); In re Value Rent-A-Car, 116 F.T.C.
245 (1993) (same); In re Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 644 (1989) (settling charges
that its operators failed to disclose to consumers the existence and amount of airport
surcharges and mandatory fuel charges when consumers inquire about possible rental of
Alamo’s vehicles); In re General Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 694 (1989)
(requiring national car rental company to disclose charges that are mandatory or are not
reasonably avoidable to every consumer that inquires about prices).
137
Bennett et al., supra note 133, at 117.
138
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 81, 108; Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb,
Consumer Credit and Competition: The Puzzle of Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 68, 71 (2010) (“Price competition often takes the form of price
concealment.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at 27-28; Xavier Gabaix & David
Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in
Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505-08 (2006). Visa, MasterCard, and American
Express, the DOJ recently alleged, sought to reduce price transparency for their credit card
network services. Compl., United States v. American Express Co., Civ. Act. No. 1:10-cv4496 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 2010) (alleging that merchants were prohibited from
informing consumers of the merchants’ cost in using a particular credit card network, or to
encourage the customer to use a less costly credit card or payment method). To date, Visa
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can have multiple APRs for different types of credit extensions, or that
apply for limited time periods. General purpose credit card issuers can
compete by reducing “front-end” costs, such as eliminating annual fees and
substantially discounting initial interest rates.

Consumers, ill-informed

about the long-term costs of different credit cards, can make decisions on
incidental benefits (such as receiving a T-shirt with the university logo
when signing up for a credit card on a college campus). The credit card
companies then overcharge the consumer on the less salient “back-end”
costs, with higher late fees and penalties and over-the-credit-limit fees.139
At times, consumers are disclosed the information, but do not understand
the key terms that affect the cost of using their credit card; at other times,
consumers simply do not act on the information.140
Rational companies can also seek to exploit consumers’ optimism bias.
One former CEO, for example, explained how his credit card company
successfully targeted vulnerable low-income customers “by offering ‘free’
credit cards that carried heavy hidden fees.”141 The company “used to use
the word ‘penalty pricing’ or ‘stealth pricing.’”142

The former CEO

explained how these ads targeted consumers’ optimism: “When people
make the buying decision, they don’t look at the penalty fees because they
never believe they'll be late. They never believe they'll be over limit,
right?”143 Bounded rational consumers, who are overoptimistic on their
ability and willpower to make pay off the card annually, underestimate the

and MasterCard settled with the DOJ.
139
Statement by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (May 2, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankecredit20080502.htm.
140
Federal Trade Comm’n, Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An Empirical
Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms: A Bureau of Economics Staff
Report (June 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/06/mortgage.shtm.
141
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/view/.
142
Id.
143
Id.
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costs of their future borrowings144 and demand and over-consume products
contrary to their long-term interests. Optimistic consumers opt for credit
cards with lower annual fees (but higher financing fees and penalties) over
better suited products (e.g., credit cards with higher annual fees but lower
interest rates and late payment penalties).145
For a rational competitor to debias the consumers may be too costly or
not worthwhile, given the free-rider problem. Suppose a credit card issuer
incurs the cost to educate consumers of their bounded willpower and
overconfidence.

Other competitors can free-ride on the company’s

educational efforts and quickly offer similar credit cards with lower annual
fees. Ultimately, such competition would reduce the credit card industry’s
profits, without offering any lasting competitive advantage to the firstmover.146 Consequently, the industry is better off exploiting consumers’
bounded rationality. Consumers, overconfident in their financial prowess,
will not demand better-suited products. Firms have little financial incentive
to help consumers make better choices.147 Market demand, accordingly,
will skew toward products and services that exploit or reinforce the
consumers’ bounded will-power and rationality.
1. Scenario II’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Rational
Customers under this scenario may reign supreme (in choosing
commitment devices to address their bounded rationality and willpower) or
be exploited. So in distinguishing between behavioral exploitation and
when firms are helping bounded rational consumers, the government under
Scenario II faces two difficulties.
144

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 196-97; Sha Yang et al., Unrealistic Optimism
in Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J. ECON. PSYCH. 170 (2007).
145
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at **.
146
Id. at 8-9, 20-21.
147
See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, supra note 59, at ' 7.2 (noting how market is more
vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a firm that first offers a lower price or improved
product to customers will retain relatively few customers after its rivals respond).
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One difficulty is that the government cannot necessarily rely on
consumers’ choices to infer their utility. Economists historically assessed
people’s preferences, not by their subjective beliefs or intentions, but by
their actual choices.148 But if heuristics and biases systematically appear in
consumer decision-making, then consumer choices do not always reflect
actual consumer preferences.149 Bounded rational consumers in Scenario II
can predict poorly as to what makes them happy.150 At times, rational firms
through advertising and promotions manipulate consumer preferences.151
A second difficulty is that some sophisticated consumers, aware of their
bounded rationality and willpower, will incur costs on commitment devices
that could appear to a rational government as exploitative.
example Christmas club savings accounts.

Take for

Bank customers deposit

throughout the year into their Christmas accounts (which do not offer
superior interest rates) and cannot withdraw the funds until the holidays. A
rational government official could view Christmas accounts as exploitative:
Customers get less (in terms of interest rate and liquidity). Banks get more
148

The Economics A-Z, The Economist (“To model demand it is only necessary to be
able to compare an individual’s consumption decisions in situations with different prices
and/or incomes and to assume that consumers are consistent in their decisions over time
(that is, if they prefer wine to beer in one period they will still prefer wine in the next).”),
http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=R#revealedpreferenc
e.
149
Garcés, supra note 133, at 148; George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB.
ECON. 1795 (2008); Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the
Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-4 (2006) (“If people
display bounded rationality when it comes to maximizing utility, then their choices do not
necessarily reflect their ‘true’ preferences, and an exclusive reliance on choices to infer
what people desire loses some of its appeal.”); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can
Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 402, 404-05 (2002).
150
Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing
Illusion, SCIENCE, June 30, 2006, at 1908; David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does
Living in California Make People Happy?, PSYCHOL. SCI., Sept. 1998, at 345; Daniel
Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION & EXPERIENCED UTILITY, 20 J.
ECON. PERSP. 221 (2006).
151
DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS 76, 115-17, 206 (2010); JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1998).
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(longer time horizon to use funds without risk of withdrawals). Rational
consumers with willpower would chose risk-free illiquid funds with better
yields (e.g., Certificates of Deposit) or keep the funds in their savings
accounts.

But Christmas accounts provide bounded rational consumers

with a commitment device and divisibility (namely a separate account
earmarked for Christmas shopping).152
Thus a key issue under Scenario II is how the rational government
identifies

and

responds

to

sustained

behavioral

exploitation.

Authoritarianism and corporate autocracy are two worst-case scenarios.
Under a market economy, consumers, through their informed economic
decisions, should ultimately reign supreme.

But if bounded rational

consumers choose poorly, one danger is that the rational government by
default decides for consumers.

If consumers are bounded rational, the

justification goes, markets are not functioning as efficiently as they could
be; thus the state becomes the de facto guardian to protect its citizens from
their irrationality. But a heightened concern about consumers’ bounded
rationality raises far greater social and political concerns over consumer
sovereignty and “the intrusion of bureaucracy into all spheres of human life
and activity.”153 The concern over behavioral exploitation can increasingly
justify “the subordination of every individual’s whole life, work, and leisure
to the orders of those in power and office.”154
In displacing individual autonomy, the rational government does not
help consumers improve their willpower or rationality.

Instead the

government promotes learned helplessness. Now the government devotes
greater energies to regulate marketplace behavior and displace the market’s

152

Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 75 (Camerer ed., 2004).
153
MISES, supra note 64, at 14.
154
Id.
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function in finding solutions for consumers’ problems.155 The government
places greater restrictions on consumers to manage their affairs, as it
devises ways to improve consumers’ diets, to restrict their consumption of
harmful products, such as alcohol, and for consumers to use their leisure
time more productively, such as exercising and reading rather than watching
television.156
Nor is there any incentive to improve the citizens’ bounded rationality
and willpower.

A bureaucracy that exists to protect bounded rational

consumers cannot afford to let its citizens become more rational. The
bureaucrats’ livelihood, authority, and status depend on consumers
remaining sufficiently irrational to justify the bureaucracy’s existence.157
Instead consumers are encouraged to register their complaints with the
government, who intercedes on their behalf. These concerns provide the
government greater justification to regulate the remaining rational firms’
behavior.

To provide what it perceives as the consumers’ needs, the

government justifies regulating further the production of goods and
services, leading to less diversity, fewer consumer choices, and greater
allocative inefficiency. The heavily regulated firms become de facto state
enterprises. As Hayek observed, “planning leads to dictatorship, because
dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and the
enforcement of ideals and, as such, essential if central planning on a large
scale is to be possible.”158
In this worst-case scenario, economic competition ceases to be a
concern. Competition and personal liberty are displaced by a centrally-

155

J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Intel, Apple, Google, Microsoft,
and Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/101118fallforum.pdf.
156
MISES, supra note 64, at 22.
157
NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 51-52.
158
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 78 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1944).
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Thus some

accept the cost of behavioral exploitation versus the greater costs of losing
economic freedom to an increasingly authoritarian government.159
But if the government takes a laissez-faire approach and renounces any
intention to regulate the market, this raises another danger, namely
corporate autocracy. Here the outcome is equally anti-democratic.
Economically powerful firms lobby the government to refrain from
regulating the marketplace. Firms, while economically exploiting bounded
rational consumers, also exploit their fears about authoritarianism. Firms
advocate the virtues of consumer sovereignty under a laissez-fair approach.
Indeed rational choice theory can play into bounded rational consumers’
overconfidence as to their sovereignty and ability to discipline firms that
attempt to exercise market power.

Under this ideology, markets are

presumably efficient (or heading toward greater efficiency), and
competition law is limited to the market failures outlined in Scenario I.
Once economic power and wealth are concentrated, the government and
its competition policies are used to preserve the status quo.160 Industries in
pre-war Germany, for example, enlisted the state through compulsory cartel
laws to complete their market power.161 The dominant firms maintain their

159

One need only look at China’s dismal experience under Mao Zedong’s authoritarian
regime. JONATHAN FENBY, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA: THE FALL AND
RISE OF A GREAT POWER 1850-2009 525 (2009) (besides the human losses and suffering,
estimating the economic cost of the Cultural Revolution at the equivalent of $34 billion).
In defending the economic liberalizations in China’s Special Economic Zones, one Chinese
official queried how many state officials would be willing to live in a zone where leftist
policies would be applied through “total state planning, rationing and queuing for food,
where foreign investment and foreigners would be banned, and inhabitants would not be
allowed to travel or send their children abroad.” Id. at 648.
160
Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 521–25 (providing examples); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 6.
161
HAYEK, SERFDOM, supra note 158, at 93–94; JOHN M. KLEEBERG, GERMAN
CARTELS:
MYTHS
AND
REALITIES,
http://www.econ.barnard.columbia.edu/~econhist/papers/Kleeberg_German_Cartels.pdf
(estimated 550 to 600 German cartels existed in 1911, about 1,000 in 1922; 1,500 by 1933;
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power by redefining the goals of competition policy and directing antitrust
enforcement against unions (which happened early in the Sherman Act’s
history162). Antitrust policy characterizes concentration, even to the brink
of monopoly, as beneficial. Monopoly profits are praised as “an important
element of the free-market system,” in serving as an inducement to
“attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place” and engage in “risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth.”163 Political and social
concerns over dominant firms’ influence and the effect of their size on the
economy as a whole are dismissed as ill-founded fears over bigness and
prosperity. These non-economic antitrust goals are deemed out of touch
with the latest economic thinking, premised on rational choice theory.164
Once economic and political power is consolidated, monopolies and cartels
can become “governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends.”165
Citizens are denied the right to use the democratic process to protect them;
instead they navigate the market’s dark alleyways, hoping that little
economic harm comes to them.
2. Scenario II’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Bounded
Rational
The prospect of bounded rational consumers and government raises
several additional policy risks. One risk is that rational firms use consumer
and 1,800 by 1938).
162
The eighth federal antitrust action brought by the United States was against Eugene
V. Debs. CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED
BY THE UNITED STATES 1890–1951 69 (1952). The United States prosecuted numerous
unions and union officials. Id. at 459–60 (index of cases against unions); PAUL E.
HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 140 (1939) (the
first persons to serve jail sentences resulting from Sherman Act violations were Eugene V.
Debs and others, growing out of the Pullman strike of 1894).
163
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
164
Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 281-91 (2010).
165
John H. Crider, Roosevelt Calls for Cartels Curb: In Letter to Hull He Says Types
of ‘Trusts’ Used by Reich Must Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at 1 (quoting
President Roosevelt).
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protection as a pretext to restrict competition. To “protect” consumers from
making irrational decisions, competitors agree to compete only along some
parameters, such as quality or service, rather than price. In National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, for example, the competing
engineers refused “to discuss prices with potential customers until after
negotiations . . . resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.”166 The
Society claimed that if engineers discussed prices at the onset with
prospective clients, low bids would result.

This in turn would tempt

individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public
safety and health. The engineers’ behavior, when characterized favorably,
was paternalistic. Customers, the engineers argued, could not account all
the variables involved in the projects’ actual performance.167 The Supreme
Court rejected the engineers’ justification.168

But the bounded rational

government, assuming that bounded rational consumers choose poorly,
might accept it.
A second risk is that rational competitors use the bounded rational
government to orchestrate their cartel. In many aspects, a bounded rational
government is more effective than a private cartel in policing the anticompetitive restrictions and punishing any offenders.169

166

435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
Id. at 694 (engineers arguing that customers could not intelligibly decide whether
its “interest in quality-which may embrace the safety of the end product-outweighs the
advantages of achieving cost savings by pitting one competitor against another”).
168
Id. at 695 (recognizing its inability (and its lack of authority under the Sherman
Act) to weigh the loss of price competition with the public benefit of preventing inferior
engineering work and insuring ethical behavior, and characterizing engineers’ justifications
as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act”); see also
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (rejecting defense that in
competitive information market consumers will “make unwise and even dangerous
choices”).
169
Compl. at 12, United States v. Ky. Real Estate Comm'n, No. 3:05CV188-H (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 31, 2005), www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f208300/208393.pdf. Defendant served as
the sole licensing authority for the state’s real estate brokers. It banned brokers from
offering home buyers a cash rebate, such as $1,000, or an inducement, like a free
167
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A third policy risk arises from the overconfidence bias. Citizens are
overconfident in the government’s ability to regulate the market for abuses.
For example, in one survey “[r]oughly half of all African Americans and
Hispanics, and over 60 percent of Hispanic immigrants [believed]
erroneously [that] lenders are required by law to give a borrower the best
rates possible.”170 The bounded rational government is overconfident in its
citizens’ ability to fend for themselves171 and the ability of markets to selfcorrect.
A fourth policy risk is that the bounded rational government causes
greater harm in seeking to protect bounded rational consumers.

For

example, after a recent disaster, bounded rational consumers and the
government under the availability heuristic would overestimate the
probability of that event happening in the future. The government heavily
regulates the industry, while not addressing other risks, that while not
coming immediately to mind, actually cause greater harm.172 Even without
television, if the buyer used that broker. To enforce the rebate ban, Defendant investigated
alleged violations, asked real estate brokers to inform it when any competing brokers
offered rebates or other inducements, and took disciplinary action against brokers who
offered customers rebates or other inducements, including suspending or revoking brokers’
licenses, imposing monetary fines, issuing reprimands, and requiring completion of
additional academic credit hours. Id. at 33.
170
Fannie Mae, The Growing Demand for Housing: 2002 Fannie Mae National
Housing
Survey
9
(2002),
available
at
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf.
171
For example, the FTC under the Reagan administration limited Section 5 liability of
unfair practices to injuries which consumers could not reasonably have avoided. FTC
Policy Statement on Unfairness, Appended to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1070 (1984). As the FTC stated,
Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer
choice-the ability of individual consumers to make their own private purchasing
decisions without regulatory intervention--to govern the market. We anticipate that
consumers will survey the available alternatives, choose those that are most desirable,
and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory.
The FTC Statement however recognized some forms of behavioral exploitation, such as
when firms “exercise undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers, as by
promoting fraudulent ‘cures’ to seriously ill cancer patients.”
172
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STANFORD L. REV. ** (1999)
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the government’s help, bounded rational consumers can overreact, based on
how the issue is framed173 or to rumors, causing social losses, a concern
China authorities recently raised.174
3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario II
Consumers can be worse off when the government (whether rational or
bounded rational) acts or does not act. So what should the government do,
especially if the extent of its bounded rationality is unknown?
The government can consider behavioral options, some less paternalistic
than others, to deter behavioral exploitation while leaving room for
innovation that benefits consumers and preserves economic liberty.
One well-known behavioral remedy is for the government to alter
existing, or create new, default rules.175 One recent issue was that banks
were exploiting consumers’ propensity to overspend their assigned credit
limits. Suppose the consumer with bounded willpower sees designer-label
shoes on the discount rack. The consumer has $20 of available credit; the
shoes cost $100. The bank permits the consumer to charge the shoes, but
extracts a high fee.176 Overdraft fees are also an issue with debit cards,
173

Marwan Sinaceur et al., Emotional and Deliberative Reactions to a Public Crisis:
Mad Cow Disease in France, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 247 (2005), available at http://facultygsb.stanford.edu/heath/documents/PsychSci-Mad%20Cow.pdf. The field study showed
how French newspaper articles more often featured the emotional label ‘‘Mad Cow’’
disease than the more abstract and scientific label (Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, CJD, or
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, BSE). Beef consumption dropped “significantly when
many articles mentioned the Mad Cow frame during the previous month, but was
unaffected by the number of articles in the previous month that mentioned the scientific
frames.” Id. at 251.
174
Hu Meidong & Peng Yining, Chinese Lacking Scientific Literacy: Knowledge
Crucial to Development and Stability, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 2, 2010, at 4 (expressing
concern of 300% price increase of mung beans since April 2010 after false claim that beans
cure cancer).
175
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 78 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Camerer et
al., supra note 11, at 1211.
176
Marcy Gordon, House Passes Credit Card Bill That Helps Consumers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/30/housepasses-credit-card-_n_194126.html. During the financial crisis, the major U.S. banks
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where the consumer makes a purchase for an amount greater than the
balance in the consumer’s bank account. Consumers paid in 2009 a record
$38.5 billion in overdraft fees, nearly double the amount reported in
2000.177 Ninety-three percent of the overdraft revenues came from about
fourteen percent of the U.S. bank accounts, with the larger banks charging
the highest fees.178
Rather than prohibit outright over-the-limit fees or regulate the size of
such fees, Congress in the Credit CARD Act of 2009 chose a behavioral
remedy.

It changed the default option.179

Before 2010, many banks

automatically enrolled consumers in their over-the-limit plan. Under the
Act, the credit card company cannot impose an over-the-limit fee for any
extension of credit in excess of the previously-authorized credit limit unless
the consumer expressly opts into the over-the-limit plan.180
For rational actors with perfect willpower, the default option should not
affect the outcome. But in the Federal Reserve’s testing, the majority of
surveyed participants preferred setting the default as consumers having to
opt into the bank’s overdraft program rather than having to opt out (which
raised fees further. Eric Dash, Bank Fees Rise as Lenders Try to Offset Losses, N.Y.
TIMES,
July
2,
2009,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/02fees.html.
177
Saskia Scholtes & Francesco Guerrera, Banks in $38.5bn Windfall from Fees, FIN.
TIMES,
Aug.
10,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecca5750-8545-11de-9a6400144feabdc0.html.
178
Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, The Card Game: Overspending on Debit Cards Is a
Boon for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/09debit.html .
179
See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1738–39. With respect to debit cards, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System amended Regulation E to limit the ability of a
financial institution to assess an overdraft fee for paying automated teller machine (ATM)
and one-time debit card transactions that overdraw a consumer’s account, unless the
consumer affirmatively consents, or opts in, to the institution’s payment of overdrafts for
these
transactions.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20091112a1.pdf;
http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_overdraft.htm.
180
Id. This provision, like many other provisions of the Act, took effect in February
2010. See id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 1735.
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many banks preferred).181 Default options have played an important role in
diverse settings,182 including class actions.183 Changing default options may
be underway in other areas. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, for example, is
dissatisfied with the “traditional opt-out, ‘notice and choice’ model” that
“inappropriately places the burden on consumers to read and understand
lengthy, complicated privacy policies that almost no one reads, and no one
understands.”184
As a second option, the government can require consumers to choose
among the options. The European Commission, for example, challenged
Microsoft for bundling or tying its web browser, Internet Explorer to its
dominant client personal computer operating system, Windows.185 Before
the settlement, consumers who used Windows had Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer as their default web browser.

Although consumers could

download other browsers, many did not, a function not attributable

181

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Final rule; official staff
commentary,
12
C.F.R.
Part
205,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20091112a1.pdf.
182
SUNSTEIN & THALER, NUDGE, supra note 175, at 129-30; Stefano DellaVigna,
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 315, 322 n.11
(2009) (collecting studies on default options in retirement savings, contractual choice in
health-clubs, organ donation, and car insurance plan choice); Eric J. Johnson et al.,
Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 5-15
(2003) (consent to receive e-mail marketing); C. Whan Park et al., Choosing What I Want
Versus Rejecting What I Do Not Want: An Application of Decision Framing to Product
Option Choice Decisions, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 187-202 (2000) (car option purchases).
183
European Consumer Consultative Group, Opinion on Private Damages Actions 4
(2010) (noting Europe’s recent experience that the rate of participation in opt-in procedure
for consumer claims was less than one percent, whereas under opt-out regimes, rates are
typically very high (97% in the Netherlands and almost 100% in Portugal)),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/docs/ECCG_opinion_on_actions_for_damage
s_18112010.pdf.
184
Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before the Trans Atlantic
Consumer
Dialogue
(Apr.
27,
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/100427tacdspeech.pdf.
185
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes
Microsoft's Roll-Out of Web Browser Choice, IP/10/216 (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/216&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN.
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necessarily to the superiority of Microsoft’s browser but status quo bias.186
As part of its settlement, Microsoft now provides consumers a Browser
Choice Screen. Rather than having one Internet browser as the default,
computer users must choose the browser they want from the competing web
browsers listed on the screen. It is unclear how successful the settlement
has been to date. On the one hand, Microsoft’s share of the European
browser market declined after the settlement--from 44.9 percent in January
2010 to 39.8 percent in October 2010.187 But even before the settlement,
Microsoft’s browser market share was declining.188 So the market share
could have declined absent the remedy. On the other hand, the remedy, by
enabling consumers to easily choose which browser they desire, increases
the likelihood that the market share reflects more the consumers’ informed
choice, rather than the monopolist’s.189
Third, the government can educate the consumer, but use framing,
prospect theory190 and the availability heuristic to make the information
more salient.191 To increase the salience of credit card finance charges, for
example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 requires a “Minimum Payment
186

Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 555 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002)
(summarizing experimental evidence of peopling preferring current options over other
options to a degree that is difficult to justify).
187
In 2009, Microsoft’s share declined by 5.5 percentage points; in 2008 by 8 points.
Kevin J. O'Brien, European Antitrust Deal With Microsoft Barely Affects Browser Market,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
10,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/technology/11eubrowser.html?ref=business.
188
Id.
189
Emanuele Ciriolo, Behavioural Economics in the European Commission: Past,
Present and Future, OXERA AGENDA, Jan. 2011, at 3 (noting how 25% of the consumers
who
viewed
the
Choice
Screen
chose
an
alternative
browser),
http://www.oxera.com/main.aspx?id=9324.
190
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
191
Camerer et al., supra note 11, at 1231 (“Since low probabilities are so difficult to
represent cognitively, it may help to use graphical devices, metaphors (imagine choosing
one ping-pong ball out of a large swimming pool filled with balls), or relative-odds
comparisons (winning the lottery is about as likely as being struck by lightning in the next
week).”).
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Warning.”192 The credit card consumer is told in the monthly statement
how paying only the minimum amount due will increase the amount of
interest she pays and the time to repay the balance.

At times, better

disclosures entail providing less, but more important, information.193
A fourth option to deter behavioral exploitation is to set one option as
the default, but impose procedural constraints on opting out.194

For

example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 sets as the default that no credit
card may be issued to, or open end consumer credit plan established by or
on behalf of, consumers under the age of 21.195 To open a credit card
account, those under twenty-one must (i) have the signature of a cosigner,
including the parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other individual over
twenty years old who has the means to repay (and be jointly liable for) the
credit card debts or (ii) submit financial information showing their
independent means of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed
extension of credit.196
A fifth option is to afford purchasers a cooling-off period. Consumers
in an emotional, impulsive state can make unwise decisions that they later
regret.197 Federal and state laws and regulations recognize this.198 For
192

Section 201(a) of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
of 2009, House Bill 627-11 (“Credit CARD Act of 2009”), H.R. 627, 111th Cong (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-627.
193
James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Economics
Staff Report, Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of
Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms (June 2007) (finding that the current mortgage
cost disclosures failed to convey key mortgage costs to consumers, and the tested
disclosure prototype improved the surveyed consumers’ understanding, especially for more
complex loans), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/06/mortgage.shtm.
194
Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 175, at 1189. Besides
procedural constraints, they propose substantive constraints that allow people “to reject the
default arrangement, but not on whatever terms they choose.” Id.
195
H.R. 627, 111th Cong (2009).
196
Id.
197
Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate & Delayed
Monetary Rewards, SCIENCE, Oct. 13, 2004, at 503 – 507; ARIELY, supra note 114, at 89126.
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example, consumers solicited at their home or workplace can have three
days to cancel purchases of $25 or more.199 From a behavioral economics
perspective, the effectiveness of cooling off periods is mixed. On the one
hand, consumers upon reflection can reconsider a purchase, especially one
involving high pressure sale tactics. On the other hand, the more time one
has to complete a task, the behavioral economics literature suggests, the
greater the likelihood one won’t complete that task.200 For example, a
customer’s likelihood of redeeming a rebate may be inversely proportional
to the rebate period’s length.201 Consumers assume that they eventually
will seek the “discount” but procrastinate.
A sixth option is to impose a behavioral exploitation tax on the rational
firm.202 When the estimated social value of the rational firms’ behavior is
below its private value, the government can tax the rational firm the
difference. The aim of the tax is to prevent the firms from unjust enriching
themselves from their behavioral exploitation. For example, revenues from
payday lending that come from APRs above a certain level would be taxed
at higher rates. Credit card revenues earned from late fees would be taxed
at higher rates than revenue from annual fees.
A seventh option is for the government to take preventive measures to
198

Camerer et al., supra note 11, at 1241-44 (collecting federal and state cooling-off
statutes).
199
Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other
Locations,
16
C.F.R.
Part
429;
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro03.shtm; see also 12 C.F.R. '
226.15 (Regulation Z cooling-off period).
200
Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219-224 (2002); Amos Tversky & Eldar
Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decisions, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 358
(1992).
201

Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 391-95 (2007); see also Virginia Postrel, The GiftCard Economy, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009 (noting the longer the expiration period, the less
likely one will redeem gift card).
202
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by
a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 (2003).
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help consumers debias themselves and improve their willpower. Here the
aim is to make consumers less susceptible to behavioral exploitation.203
The government can increase (i) the supply of debiasing methods (e.g.,
adding courses on financial literacy in high school (emphasizing the
behavioral risks and investors’ susceptibility to overconfidence bias204)), (ii)
the demand for debiasing (such as imposing procedural constraints on
consumer participation in high risk areas of behavioral exploitation, such as
subprime lending, unless the consumer participated in an approved online
course that outlines the material risks), and (iii) the opportunities to debias,
such as facilitating timely feedback mechanisms, so that consumers become
aware of their errors and the costs of their poor choices (e.g., providing
employees who have not enrolled into a retirement plan a monthly reminder
of how much money they lost to date in matching funds by not contributing
to the 401(k)).

The government can also provide consumers with

commitment devices (to the extent the market has not provided them).
An eighth option is to increase the search costs of rational firms to
identify potential victims. One resounding success of the FTC is enabling
consumers to easily opt out of all unwanted telephone solicitations.205 The
government through a similar common listing service can enable consumers

203

Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1245, 1264 (2005) (exploring how “the first approach of the libertarian central planner
would be to debias individuals so that they can make their own rational decisions about
which choices best promote their own welfare”).
204
Financial literacy efforts have had mixed results. One study of Harvard
undergraduate students and MBA students from Wharton, for example, found a “low
absolute level of financial sophistication” with subjects basing choices on normatively
irrelevant mutual fund attributes. James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price
Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-14, at 25
(Apr. 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125023.
205
See, e.g., National Do-Not-Call Registry, 15 U.S.C. § 6102; 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B). As September 30, 2008, over 172.5 million telephone numbers were
on the do-not-call list. See also Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110187, 122 Stat. 633 (2008) (telephone numbers placed on the National Do-Not-Call-Registry
can remain on it permanently).
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to opt out of home or mail solicitations (including credit card offerings), and
to easily block home-shopping cable stations. The government can increase
consumers’ privacy rights to make it harder for firms to identify especially
bounded rational consumers through their purchasing behavior.
Some argue that “[a]dvocating soft paternalism is akin to advocating an
increased role of the incumbent government as an agent of persuasion.”206
Scenario II’s policy risks indeed represent a balancing act.

While

government persuasion increases the risk of authoritarianism, government
inaction carries the risks of behavioral exploitation and corporate autocracy.
Moreover, anti-“soft” paternalism can itself be paternalistic.

If most

consumers (like those in the Federal Reserve’s testing) prefer having the
default as an opt-in (e.g., requiring consumers to opt into the banks’
overdraft programs), then assuming that consumers are indeed sovereign,
the banks should comply.

If the banks, however, are unresponsive to

consumer demand and require consumers to opt out, why can’t the citizens
lobby their elected representatives to get what they want? It is hard to see
why citizens, in the name of libertarianism, must continue to wait for their
desired default option.
Accordingly, under any conception of competition with bounded
rational consumers, one cannot view antitrust and consumer protection as
distinct. Under Scenario II, consumer protection and competition law both
promote the opportunity of informed consumer choices. Ideally, informed
consumers choose among the innovating firms’ solutions for their
problems.207 Given the importance of individual autonomy in overall wellbeing, the government must carefully delineate between behavioral
206

Glaeser, supra note 105, at 156.
Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity Through
Competition Law 3, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND
LIMITATIONS (Josef Drexl et al. eds., Edward Elgar, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543725.
207
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exploitation and behavioral freedom, where firms help consumers address
their bounded rationality and willpower.

After all, if antitrust policy

promotes diversity and the process of search and experimentation, it would
be counterproductive if consumer protection law bans all products except
the one the government believes is the best.

Ideally, competition and

consumer protection laws deter market failure (e.g., systemic behavioral
exploitation), and ensure that consumers, once informed, have a choice as to
products and services.
C. Scenario III: Bounded Rational Firms and Rational Consumers
Here consumers are relatively more rational than firms in the
industry.208 Excessive optimism can have procompetitive benefits, such as
the firms’ willingness to innovate and enter new markets.209 But excessive
optimism can adversely affect the firms and economy.

Consumers, in

response to the firms’ behavior, ask, “What were they thinking?” One
recurring theme in the business literature is how once mighty firms (e.g., the

208

For Scenarios III and IV, one must also distinguish between the firms’ and
economists’ conception of rationality. See, e.g., Russell Pittman, Who Are You Calling
Irrational? Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of Firms, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 09-3 (July
2009)
(noting
this
disconnect
as
to
pricing
decision),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/248394a.htm. Some economists view marginal costs
narrowly, and deem business executives who take fixed and sunk costs into account in their
pricing decisions as naïve. But as Pittman points out, in the long-run, a firm’s revenues
must cover not only its operating costs but its invested capital. Id. at 2. “Setting price
equal to average variable cost, with no ‘margin’ for fixed costs, is a strategy for firms
exiting a market, not for long-term survival.” Id. at 5. Thus a profit-maximizing firm
produces where its MC (marginal cost) = AVC (average variable cost) + FC (fixed cost) /
Q (quantity). Firms may also engage in other conduct what economists deem as
“irrational,” but which consumers deem as fair. Some economists are agnostic on price
discrimination or believe that in certain instances it may be pro-competitive; ninety-one
percent of individuals in one survey thought charging higher prices to those who are more
dependent on the product was offensive. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735 (1986). So
even though firms could price discriminate, some may decline, so as to not offend their
customers.
209
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 11; Don A. Moore et al., What Competition? Myopic
Self-Focus in Market-Entry Decisions, 18 ORG. SCI. 440,441-42 (2007).
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U.S. car manufacturers210) lose sight of their customers’ needs or are in
denial.211
This Scenario helps explain why some corporate executives, with much
to lose, risk criminal liability by fixing prices with their competitors,212 are
likely to advocate a merger,213 are overconfident about a merger’s likely
efficiencies,214 overvalue the purchased assets,215 are overly confident or
pessimistic about their chances of entering particular markets,216 and
210

John E. Kwoka, Jr., The U.S. Industry Under Duress: Fit, or Finished?, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 49 (2009).
211
See, e.g., RICHARD S. TEDLOW, DENIAL: WHY BUSINESS LEADERS FAIL TO LOOK
FACTS IN THE FACE-AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2010); Strategic Decisions: When Can
You
Trust
Your
Gut?,
MCKINSEY
Q.
(March
30,
2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/30/decision-making-gut-leadership-managingmckinsey.html.
212
Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds. Hart
Publishing Oxford forthcoming 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720.
213
Ulrike Malmendier, A “New” Paradigm in Corporate Finance: The Role of
Managers and Managerial Biases, 4 NBER REPORTER 13, 15-16 (2010) (discussing
correlation between overconfidence and acquisitions by cash-rich firms not dependent on
external financing).
214
See, e.g., Matthew T. Billett & Yiming Qian, Are Overconfident CEOs Born or
Made? Evidence of Self Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1037
(2008) (finding from sample of public acquisitions between 1985 and 2002 that CEOs who
previously engaged in a successful acquisition appear to overly attribute their role in
successful deals, leading to more deals even though these subsequent deals are value
destructive); ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE
THE ASHES (2005) (summarizing major failed mergers).
215
Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103 (1997) (finding from
empirical study of mergers over $100 million involving publicly traded firms over four
year period that CEO hubris plays a substantial role in acquisition process and acquisitions
tend to reduce shareholder wealth); see also Mauricio R. Delgado et al., Understanding
Overbidding Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions,
SCIENCE, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1849; RICHARD H. THALER, WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–62 (1992) (discussing experimental and field
evidence); Mackintosh, supra note 129, at 15 (discussing a 2010 auction of a $20 bill for
$61).
216
Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 INDIANA L.J.
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing increasing interest in behavioral economics and its
applications to competition law), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582720; Maurice
E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007).
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consistent with the sunk cost fallacy throw good money after bad in
corporate projects.217
Professor Waller recently examined the evidence from corporate finance
that suggests entire categories of mergers are more likely to destroy, rather
than enhance, shareholder value.218 Among the well-known biases and
heuristics relevant to the decision to enter in mergers and acquisitions,
which frequently result in value destroying transactions, include “myopia,
loss aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, extremeness aversion,
over-optimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability heuristics,
framing effects, representative bias, saliency effects, and others.”219
Executives, in behavioral studies, were overconfident in their ability to
manage a company, systematically underestimated their competitors’
strength, and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g.,
taking credit for positive outcomes and blaming the environment for
negative outcomes).220
Scenario III in theory should be of less concern. Absent a natural
monopoly or high entry barriers, rational consumers should take their
business elsewhere. The critical assumption is that when bounded rational
217

Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey 49 (Sept. 29, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=602902; Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of
Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 124-140
(1985).
218
Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy at 48 (Sept.
23, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681673; Pittman, supra note 208, at 21519 (discussing empirical literature that stockholders of acquiring firms do not benefit or do
not benefit much from mergers).
219
Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 218, at 48.
220
Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations,
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 246, 260-64 (Peter Diamond &
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). For several recent surveys of the empirical literature see
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 9-13; Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral
Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (Spring 2010);
C. Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Max
Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprint No. 2008/23 7-8 (May 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184.
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counterparts,

are

overoptimistic over a merger’s efficiencies, overconfident in their escaping
detection for their cartel activities, and more or less risk averse in entering a
new market, they quickly bear the cost of their miscalculation. The market
swiftly punishes the bounded rationality. The firm swiftly corrects or is
eliminated.
But this is not always true. As the financial crisis reflects, many Wall
Street firms were not swiftly punished (or their executives ever punished)
for their bounded rationality.221 Thus one cannot assume that corporate
behavior is always as, if not more, rational than consumer behavior.
1. Scenario III’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is
Rational
One cannot say that the government is always less rational than private
firms. With politically-accountable elected representatives from different
communities, a legislature can see what firms and individuals in any
community may not see.222 This does not mean that the government is
always more rational than the average firm or citizen. But the legislature
has a unique vantage. As President Roosevelt wrote in recommending the
strengthening and enforcement of the antitrust laws, the larger and more
important question involves honest citizens “who cannot see the social and
economic consequences of their actions in a modern economically
interdependent community.”223
221

See, e.g., Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New
Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin, University of Haifa Faculty of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, at 39 (Dec. 1, 2009) (noting how some bounded rational
manufacturers will overuse resale price maintenance, and as the historical evidence and
behavioral research reveal, “the efficacy of repeated decisions, organizations, and market
pressure in correcting manufacturer bias is limited”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948.
222
See Essay 10 of the Federalist, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 173 (David Wootton ed. 2003).
223
Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, Apr.
29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in I.iv EARL W.
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If private firms are less rational than consumers and the government,
then one risk under Scenario III is that the government will seek to run the
marketplace like a government bureaucracy. The government may seek to
displace the bounded rational firms with state-owned enterprises or regulate
the firms with the goal “to organize the whole national economy like the
postal system.”224 The government in its central planning could become
less rational.

And the resulting risks (including authoritarianism) and

societal welfare loss from governmental action may far exceed the losses
from firms’ bounded irrationality.
Instead of central planning, a rational government should return to first
principles, and inquire why consumers did not (or could not) punish the
bounded rational firm.

When rational consumers are sovereign under

Scenario III, private firms have a strong incentive to use de-biasing
mechanisms to gain a competitive advantage and avoid consumer
punishment.225 Scenario III’s policy implications differ from Scenario II’s.
Under Scenario II, it makes sense at times to insulate rational firms from
consumers’ bounded rationality and willpower (such as promoting the
firm’s incentives to maximize long-term value and economic efficiency,
contrary to the pressures of bounded rational investors to maximize the
stock price in the short-term).226 Under Scenario III, in contrast, it makes
sense at times to expose bounded rational firms to market demands,227 such
as identifying and eliminating those protective barriers (e.g., high import
tariffs) or subsidies that reduce the firms’ incentives to debias.228

KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 3408 (1978).
224
MISES, supra note 64, at xvi (quoting LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (1917)).
225
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 3, 16.
226
Baker et al., supra note 217, at 3.
227
Id. at 3.
228
Another possibility is that the managerial decisions are infrequent and do not
provide clear feedback to managers, shareholders and consumers. Camerer & Malmendier,
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One significant incentive to debias is the prospect of failure and market
exit.229

Suppose a bounded rational firm, overconfident in its risk

assessment models, becomes more leveraged. Ideally industry regulators,
creditors and shareholders monitor the bounded rational firm to prevent
such over-leveraging. But if the bounded rational firm is deemed too big
(or important) to fail, the dynamics change. A dominant firm has greater
incentive (and freedom) to take excessive risks. Rational investors know of
the firm’s implicit government guarantee. Its shareholders and creditors
will not punish this risk-taking: when the risky investments work in the
firm’s favor, they benefit.

When the risky investments flop, the

government’s implicit guarantee forecloses the possibility of market exit.230
The government guarantee itself has value, which the dominant firm can
use to reduce its borrowing costs.231 The too-big-to-fail firms thus enjoy a
competitive advantage over smaller rivals, which are allowed to fail.232
Smaller firms, which cannot undertake such risk, cannot profit accordingly
when the bets pay off. Without a government guarantee, the smaller firms’
costs of borrowing are higher. So their incentive is to merge to where they
too become too big to fail. Indeed one criticism is that after the crisis, U.S.
financial institutions increased their market power by acquiring competitors
supra note 220, at 258.
229
In addition, there is the principal/agent problem. Managers have the incentive to
take on large risks, when there is no downside to them personally. If the risky venture
succeeds, the manager benefits from the increase in value to the firm and their
compensation. If the risky venture fails, the managers may have already left the firm or
leave with a golden parachute. CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 291.
230
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 204.
231
Id. at 180-81 (noting that during the crisis large banks could borrow money at rates
0.78 percentage points more cheaply than smaller banks, which was higher than the
average differential of 0.29 percentage points between 2000 and 2007).
232
STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 166; Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England,
Speech to the Scottish business organizations (Oct. 20, 2009) (“Encouraging banks to take
risks that result in large dividend and remuneration payouts when things go well, and losses
for taxpayers when they don’t,” remarked the Governor of the Bank of England, “distorts
the
allocation
of
resources
and
management
of
risk.”),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf.
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(such as Bank of America absorbing Merrill Lynch and Countrywide,
JPMorgan Chase acquiring Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, and
Wells Fargo acquiring Wachovia), while nonbank mortgage lenders exited
the marketplace.233
Consequently, since overconfidence, especially for firms less dependent
on lending intermediaries, can motivate merger activity, rational
competition officials under Scenario III would display (i) greater skepticism
over the likely efficiencies of otherwise problematic mergers,234 (ii) greater
concern over the systemic risks posed by mergers and (iii) greater
skepticism over the likelihood and magnitude of false positives in merger
review.
2. Scenario III’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is
Bounded Rational
One risk is that the bounded rational government, overconfident in its
understanding of competition, relies on empirically suspect presumptions.
In presuming that firms are as rational as consumers, the government’s
theory of competition resembles Scenario I, when empirically it resembles
Scenario III.

The bounded rational government’s mergers policies

accordingly are too lenient while its criminal prosecutions of price-fixers
are too severe.
One concern is that the government when confronted with evidence of
firms’ bounded rationality, either attempts to justify the behavior under
rational choice theory, or if no explanation exists, ignores it. For example,
the U.S. Merger Guidelines assume that market participants behave as

233

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 171-72, 180 (noting how those three banks and
Citibank controlled half the market for new mortgages, and two-thirds of the market for
new credit cards).
234
Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 218, at 56 (noting how corporate
finance literature suggests that mega-mergers on a stock for stock basis between roughly
equal competitors are highly likely to destroy shareholder value).
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rational profit-maximizers.235 Accordingly, sustained market power is not
theoretically feasible where entry barriers are low.236

Antitrust policy

assumes that (1) supra-competitive prices will attract rational profitmaximizing firms into markets characterized with low entry barriers, (2) the
new entrants will replenish the lost output, and (3) as a result, prices will
return closer to marginal cost. Operating under the false impression that
market participants, pursuing their economic interest, will self-police and
regulate, the government will be more concerned about the risk of false
positives than negatives from their enforcement activity, especially in
markets characterized with moderate to low entry barriers.237
But under Scenario III, contrary to the Guidelines’ hypothesis, firms do
not always enter markets with low entry barriers to defeat the exercise of
market power.238 Nor does a bounded rational government inquire why
price-fixing occurs in markets with low entry barriers.239

Instead the

government seeks to reconcile this non-entry with its flawed economic
theory (e.g., markets that “superficially” appear to have low entry barriers,
actually are more difficult to enter so rational profit-maximizing firms
accurately discerned that entry would have been unprofitable at pre-merger
levels).240

235

Merger Guidelines, supra note 59, at § 1.0.
Id. at § 9.0; Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Ins., 784 F.2d 1325
(7th Cir. 1986) (“the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of new entry, the
less power existing firms have”).
237
Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122476545437862295.html.
238
Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 216.
239
Id.
240
This ex post justification is a difference in perception – what seems like easy
markets to enter (turtles) are actually quite difficult. But this raises the accuracy of
competition agencies (typically their paralegals and new lawyers) in screening thousands of
HSR merger filings annually. How will they know that the superficially low entry barrier
market is actually a high or low entry market? Thus, a bounded rational government
official can seek to explain ex post the lack of entry that is consistent with rational choice
theory, but the issue is predicting entry ex ante.
236
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While too lenient in merger review, the bounded rational government,
overconfident in its theory of optimal deterrence, can be too punitive in its
criminal antitrust prosecutions.

This too can harm consumers. The

government erroneously believes that price fixers, under Scenario III,
behave as rational profit-maximizers.

To deter cartels, neoclassical

economic theory posits that the penalty should equal at least the violation’s
expected net harm to others (plus enforcement costs) divided by the
probability of detection and proof of the violation.241 Setting the antitrust
penalty at this optimal level, in theory, should result in the socially optimal
level of price-fixing.
Faced with evidence of durable cartels and high recidivism, a bounded
rational government, under its optimal deterrence theory, can increase
either: (i) the probability of detection (which is difficult with an already
generous amnesty program to induce price fixers to implicate their coconspirators); or (ii) the criminal (and/or civil) penalties, which presumably
are sub-optimal in deterring cartels. The problem is if the antitrust penalties
are already at (or above) the optimal level. Bounded rational firms persist
in their price-fixing not because the fines are too low but due to situational
(e.g., peer pressure) and dispositional (e.g., executives’ overconfidence in
escaping detection) factors.

The bounded rational government fails to

recognize this possibility.

Rather than address these situational and

dispositional factors through a pluralism of mechanisms, such as criminal
and civil penalties, structural means (improved merger review), and
informal

norms

that

highlight

price fixing’s

ethical

and

moral

implications,242 the government instead continues to increase the penalties,
241

Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.
POL. ECON. 385, 389–90 (1993); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions
for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 656, 666–68 (1983).
242
Competition Stakeholder Study: Aggregate Report 8 (Conducted by TNS Qual+ at
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under the belief they are suboptimal. Excessive fines can harm consumers
when they cause firms to reduce investments in innovation and raise prices.
If firms cannot absorb or otherwise pass along the fines as higher prices,
then the firms either reorganize under the bankruptcy laws or exit the
market, which as a consequence has fewer meaningful competitors.243
D. Scenario IV: Bounded Rational Firms and Consumers
Under this last scenario, many market participants have bounded
rationality and willpower. Biases and heuristics are systemic. At closer
inspection, competition under Scenario IV is better viewed as a discovery
process than a stable equilibrium. Bounded rational firms have imperfect
knowledge about current and future consumer preferences, a blurred and
changing understanding of their goals and preferences, and a limited
repertoire of actions to cope with whatever problems they face.244 Bounded
rational consumers have changing and, at times, inconsistent preferences.245
They, for example, demand more choices than they actually prefer.246

the request of European Commission Directorate General Competition (July 2010) (noting
that a “number of stakeholders across all groups stressed that, while fines are an effective
deterrent, they are not the only tool available to DG Competition. A number of alternatives
were suggested (criminal sanctions, publication of the companies' infringements,
compensation payments for harmed consumers, etc.) but with mixed views about whether
individual criminal liability should be introduced as an additional deterrent.”); International
Competition Network Working Group on Cartels, Defining Hard-Core Cartel Conduct:
Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties, Report prepared by the ICN Working Group on
Cartels, ICN Fourth Annual Conference (June 2005) (noting additional ways of achieving
deterrence, including press coverage).
243
Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 481.
244
Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the Evolutionary and Behavioral Theories of
Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG. SCI. 491, 492, 494 (2007).
245
See, e.g., Steven C. Michael & Tracy Pun Palandjian, Organizational Learning and
New Product Introductions, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 268, 270 (2004)
(discussing shampoo industry dynamism where consumers with changing tastes buyers
seek variety); Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession,
116 THE ECON. J. C24, C24 (2006) (noting from happiness economic literature how “tastes
are not given – the happiness we get from what we have is largely culturally determined”).
246
Under Scenario I, providing rational consumers more choices is generally
beneficial. Rational firms target consumers’ particular needs and tastes more accurately
with more choices. Market forces should set the optimal amount of choice. Rational
manufacturers will supply (when profitable) products that satisfy the desired mix of price,
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Bounded rational firms comply, leading to suboptimal results for
consumers247 and firms.248
Scenario IV competition is an “evolutionary trial and error process, in
which the firms try out different problem solutions and can learn from the
feedback of the market, which of their specific products and technological
solutions are the superior ones.”249 Rather than an end-state capable of
performance, and other attributes. But under Scenario IV, more options do always increase
welfare. Under Scenario IV, bounded rational consumers may demand additional options
and seek to preserve existing options. In one computer experiment, participants tried to
keep options open even when counter-productive. ARIELY, supra note 114, at 142-48. In
the Door Game, each MIT student could click on three doors on the computer screen to
find the room with the biggest payoff (between 1 and 10 cents). Each student was given
100 clicks, and could click one door as many times possible without a penalty. Each time
the student sampled another door, that switch cost the student one additional click.
Experiment 2, the Disappearing Door Game, was the same as the Door Game except each
time a door was left unvisited for 12 clicks, it disappeared forever. To keep options open,
participants in Experiment 2 ended up making substantially less money (about fifteen
percent less) than participants in Experiment 1. Participants would have made more money
by sticking to one door. Id. at 147. A similar result occurred when participants were told
the exact monetary outcome they could expect from each room.
247
Some bounded rational consumers, faced with many choices, avoid choosing any
option, even when the choice of opting out has negative consequences for future wellbeing. Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs
Social Welfare, 25 J. PUBLIC POL’Y & MARKETING 24, 26 (2006) (discussing information
overload, where an increase in options raises the cognitive costs in comparing and
evaluating the options and leads to suboptimal decision strategies). Other bounded rational
consumers choose an option, but have lower confidence in their choice and greater
dissatisfaction in choosing.
248
The bounded rational firms, as a result, lose sales opportunities of their products.
Iyengar and Lepper, in their famous experiment, set up a tasting booth in an upscale
grocery store. The booth displayed either six or twenty-four different flavors of jam. A
greater percentage of the shoppers stopped to sample one of the displayed jams when the
booth had twenty-four jam flavors (60 percent versus 40 percent when booth displayed six
jam flavors). But a lower percentage actually purchased a jar of jam (3 percent versus 30
percent of customers when booth had only six flavors). Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R.
Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995–1006 (2000).
249
Kerber, supra note 207, at 2; see also Moreau, supra note 94, at 851 (discussing
how “evolutionary theory refutes the neoclassical economic theory’s focus on a steady state
of the economic system”). Industries may have multiple equilibria. The speed with which
the market approaches these equilibria may vary over time, and the equilibria themselves
may change because of change in the system itself. The result is that “equilibrium points in
an evolutionary system are rarely actually reached.” Instead, these equilibrium points
“serve as an attractor that pulls the system towards itself for a prolonged period, before
giving way to a new attractor.” B. Verspagen, The Use of Modelling Tools for Policy in
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being perfected, competition is a continuous process “in which previously
unknown knowledge is generated,” and “the multiplicity and diversity of
the (parallel trials of the) firms might be crucial for the effectiveness of
competition as a discovery procedure.”250

Firms and consumers make

mistakes, readjust, and undertake new strategies. The competitive process
“is inherently a process of trial and error with no stable end-state considered
by the participants in the process.”251
Scenario IV involves several important competitive dimensions beyond
price. First bounded rational firms can compete in the extent they debias
themselves.252 Firms (like consumers) can improve (or regress) in their
decision-making and willpower.253 The ways in which companies learn,
accomplish tasks, and deal with the uncertainty can vary firm-to-firm.254
Rather than incur costs to continually process information anew, bounded
rational firms (like consumers) can use rules-of-thumb (heuristics). Firms
with better routines and rules-of-thumb can lower their information
processing costs and secure a competitive advantage. Firms can improve
feedback mechanisms to more quickly learn from their (or other firms’)

Evolutionary Environments, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND MODELLING IN
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 4 (A. Faber et al. eds., 2006).
250
Kerber, supra note 207, at 2.
251
Moreau, supra note 94, at 851.
252
See, e.g., Andrew Healy, Do Firms Have Short Memories?: Evidence from Major
League Baseball, 9 J. SPORTS ECON. 407, 415-18 (2009) (discussing how some
professional baseball teams overweigh, relative to more successful teams, athletes’ recent
performance in determining salary).
253
See Linda Argote & Henrich R. Greve, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm – 40 Years
and Counting: Introduction and Impact, 18 ORG. SCI. 337 (2007) (surveying impact of
Behavioral Theory of the Firm’s impact on organizational science research, including
institutional theory and population ecology); Dosi & Marengo, supra note 244, at 491.
254
Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY Q. 3
(March 2010) (noting recent survey of 2,207 executives where only 28 percent said the
quality of their companies’ strategic decisions was generally good, 60 percent thought that
bad decisions were about as frequent as good ones, and 12 percent thought good decisions
were altogether infrequent).
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mistakes.255 Moreover, firms can identify common biases and take
preventive measures.256
Although an important facet of Scenario IV competition is how firms
discover and implement routines to gain a cost advantage, bounded rational
firms risk competency traps, whereby they become wedded to existing
routines, which as industry conditions change, place them at a competitive
disadvantage.257

Under Scenario IV, “[i]n some sense knowledge

depreciates in value over time.”258 Thus another important dimension of
competition is adaptive efficiency,259 whereby bounded rational firms
update routines to reflect consumers’ changing preferences.260

Firms

compete by continually learning about customer preferences and
competitors’ experimentation, and experimenting themselves with new
technologies, routines, and ways of organizing.
A second important dimension of Scenario IV competition is in
providing bounded rational consumers a better mix of solutions for their
problems.261 Through their (or monitoring their competitors’) trial-and255

John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the
Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 (2004); John A. List, Does Market Experience
Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. ECON. 41 (2003). For example, frequent and more
experienced sports cards traders display less of an endowment effect for sports cards (such
as baseball trading cards) than for other items such as chocolates and mugs.
256
Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 220, at 269 (noting some of the literature, such
as investment firms combating loss aversion by having traders switch positions with one
another).
257
Eyal Biyalogorsky et al., Stuck in the Past: Why Managers Persist with New
Product Failures, 70 J. MARKETING 108 (2006) (discussing the “extensive attention in the
literature” to firms’ escalation of commitment, which is the tendency of managers to stay
committed to a course of action despite strong negative feedback with respect to the
advisability of this action); Michael & Palandjian, supra note 245, at 270 (discussing
literature on competency traps).
258
NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 23 (discussing uncertainty in a nonergodic world (e.g., Scenario IV)).
259
Id. at 70.
260
Michael & Palandjian, supra note 245, at 275.
261
Kerber, supra note 207, at 4; MISES, supra note 64, at 24 (“competition among the
various entrepreneurs is essentially a competition among the various possibilities open to
individuals to remove as far as possible their state of uneasiness by the acquisition of
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error experiments, bounded rational firms update product offerings to
accommodate consumers’ changing preferences. Their ability depends in
part on the feedback loop’s efficacy and the competitive behavior’s
transparency.262 (Alternatively bounded rational firms in Scenario IV (as in
Scenario II) can seek to mitigate competition by reducing price transparency
and differentiating their products or services through branding and
technological innovation.263)
A third important dimension of Scenario IV competition is the value of
individuality, creativity, and distinctiveness. Under Scenario I competition,
rational individuals are undifferentiated in motivation:

They seek,

whenever the opportunity, to promote their economic self-interest. Labor is
a commodity, an instrument for providing goods and services, which can be
downsized, outsourced, or automated.264 There is no inherent dignity in
work or greater social calling to use one’s skills to society’s betterment.
But as a matter of common experience, the greater value we see our work as
having, the more meaning we can attribute to our labor, and the more
engaged and motivated we will be in our work.265 Scenario IV’s theory of
competition helps explain why firms devote significant resources in
identifying and attracting talented workers. It re-introduces moral beliefs of
consumers’ goods”).
262
Kerber, supra note 207, at 5.
263
State of Ill., ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481
(7th Cir. 1991) (“Virtually all business behavior is designed to enable firms to raise their
prices above the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive market.”); see also Desai
& Waller, supra note 76; Steiner, supra note 36, at 84-85 (discussing price premium for
strong reputation brands).
264
In contrast the Clayton Act provides that the “labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
265
DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF RATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF
DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND HOME 66-82 (2010); Jason Krieger, Creating a Culture of
Innovation,
GALLUP
MGMT.
J.,
Oct.
5,
2010,
http://gmj.gallup.com/content/143282/creating-culture-innovation.aspx (finding that higher
levels of employee engagement “correlate to more idea sharing, better idea generation,
more creativity in role, and improved business outcomes (on key items, including customer
metrics, productivity, and profitability)”).
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why we work.266 Scenario IV competition enriches our definition of labor,
namely the opportunity to use one’s unique gifts to improve the welfare of
others, and thereby express and deepen individual dignity.
In addition, by inculcating a unique identity, firms can promote (or
hinder) social, ethical and moral values that affect employee behavior;267
these values in turn can lower the firm’s monitoring costs and increase its
competitiveness.268
Scenario IV competition also presents several risks. One risk is that
with bounded rational firms and consumers, traditional forms of market
failure (such as cartels and monopolies) are likelier in Scenario IV than
Scenario I.269 The stronger the presumption of rationality, the more likely
the market will be efficient, the less the governmental concern over the
sustained exercise of market power in markets characterized with low to
moderate entry barriers. Rational consumers often can defeat the exercise
of market power by switching to lower-cost substitutes offered by rational
fringe firms or entrants. But as Scenario III discusses with bounded rational
firms, entry will not always occur, as rational choice theory predicts.270
Cartels can be more durable when price-fixers, like the subjects in other
behavioral experiments, are more trustful and cooperative than rational
choice theory predicts.271
266

R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 33 (2004) (“For what gives meaning to
economic activity, as to any other activity is [] the purpose to which it is directed.”)
267
Paul C. Nystrom, Differences in Moral Values between Corporations, 9 J. BUS.
ETHICS 971, 974 (1990) (survey of how closely-matched corporations within industrial
sectors differed significantly in perceived importance of management’s moral values).
268
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELLBEING 39–59 (2010) (exploring how
workers can abide to shared corporate norms, and lose utility when they put in low effort,
and how job-holders, if they have only monetary rewards and only economic goals, “will
game the system insofar as they can get away with it”).
269
Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 216, at 546-75.
270
Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 216.
271
Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 216; Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer, supra
note 212.
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A second risk of Scenario IV competition is new forms of market
failure. In competitive markets, firms identify and discover ways to solve
consumers’ problems.272 But the financial crisis, Professor Stiglitz wrote,
showed how the subprime mortgage industry worsened, rather than solved,
borrowers’ problems.273

Their mortgages increased costs and risks for

consumers while providing the mortgage brokers and lenders greater fees.
These products increased risk to the institutions that acquired the ensuing
credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations.274

Among the

losers in the financial crisis were other supposedly sophisticated investors
who failed to appreciate these assets’ risks.275 Moreover, these financial
innovations made speculation easer.276
A third risk arises from herding.

Herding can be beneficial, as

consumer’s utility from a product increases when others use the product.277
But herding can pressure consumers to forego the superior technology for
the perceived popular one.278 Consumers, at times, are confronted with
competing, incompatible technologies. In choosing, the consumer wants
the technology platform that others will likely choose, as the more popular
platform (e.g., Windows operating system) will attract more supporting
complements developed for that platform.279 Each consumer prefers the
superior technology.

But believing that others will opt for the subpar

technology, the consumer will choose the subpar technology and contribute
272

Kerber, supra note 207, at 4.
STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 5, 80.
274
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
275
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 199; CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 272.
276
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 239, 243-50; GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE
BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET
GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009).
277
Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal
Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 560-61 (2009).
278
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 130-31.
279
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999); Case T201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 (Ct. First Instance).
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to the suboptimal outcome.
Herding can lead to irrational exuberance (or pessimism) over stocks,
real estate, and tulips.280 As Scenario II discusses, even rational investors
can join (and lead) the herd if greater gains can be derived from inflating the
bubble and exiting before the bubble pops. Herding can lead to fads, where
a consumer’s utility from an item (such as a designer bag) depends on who
else owns the item (either the perceived trend-setters281 or masses282).
Herding can increase market turmoil. When the speculative bubble bursts,
financial institutions can decide to sell similar assets to maintain their target
leverage ratio, which further depresses the assets’ selling price, prompting
the sale of even more assets to deleverage.283
A fourth risk of Scenario IV competition is industry-specific market
failures. One example is media bias. Historically, antitrust was concerned
about supply-driven media bias.284

Dominant media firms provide

distorted, self-censored, or biased news coverage that deviates from the
coverage consumers prefer. One way to reduce supply-side media bias is to
increase competition in the marketplace of ideas. Increasing the number of
independently-owned competitors limits the media market’s supply-driven bias by
(i) increasing the likelihood that the media remain independent when governments
attempt to manipulate the news; (ii) reducing the risk of information being
suppressed or distorted when news providers have an interest in manipulating
consumers’ beliefs; and (iii) driving media firms to invest in providing timely and

280

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA (1993).
See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 25, 33 (Penguin
1994) (discussing primary motive to accumulate wealth is pecuniary emulation).
282
Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Influentials, Networks, and Public
Opinion Formation, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 441-458 (2007).
283
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 309-10.
284
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the
Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support the Media Sector’s
Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2009); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen
P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 249 (2001).
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Under Scenario IV, in contrast, more media

competition can increase, rather than reduce, media bias. Bounded rational
consumers can suffer “belief perseverance,” whereby they hold their views
notwithstanding disconfirming evidence.286

Consumers search for, and

overvalue, information that favors their pre-existing cultural outlooks; they
discount, and are reluctant to search for, information that contradicts their
pre-existing cultural outlooks.287 Bounded rational consumers seek news
outlets that reinforce their political ideology, and avoid media outlets that
challenge their beliefs.

These consumers freely trade-off (to different

degrees) the accuracy of a news source for confirmation of their preexisting beliefs.288

Accordingly, Scenario IV competition can increase

media bias, which consumers demand.289 The marketplace of ideas becomes
more fragmented. News coverage increasingly targets specific ideological
or political beliefs. This in turn deprives “societies of shared information
and experiences, leaving us less able to discuss issues, less exposed to
diverse viewpoints, and more inclined to connect primarily, or only, with

285

Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition & Truth in the Market for
News, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 134, 135–44 (2008).
286
Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased
Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
880 (1975).
287
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition & Public Policy, 24 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 149 (2006).
288
Gentzkow & Shapiro, Market for News, supra note 285, at 144–45.
289
See, e.g., Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, New Media & the Polarization of
American Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMM. 345–365 (2008); Matthew Gentzkow &
Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers,
NBER
Working
Paper
12707
(2007),
available
at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/matthew.gentzkow/biasmeas052507.pdf; Matthew Gentzkow
& Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education & Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 117-133 (2004); Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in
the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755–769 (2006); Stefano
DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias, in FACT FINDER, FACT
FILTER: HOW MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY (2007), available at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-06-25.pdf.
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With greater fragmentation of news

coverage, the danger exists that consumers seek out only those viewpoints
with which they already agree, making reasoned debate more difficult.
Thus the greater danger to democracy, under Scenario IV, is not necessarily
the lack of media competition, but too much competition and the ensuing
demand-driven media bias.
1. Scenario IV’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Rational
If the government is relatively more rational than firms and consumers,
there remains the risk, as in Scenarios II or III, of authoritarianism and
corporate autocracy.
The government, even if more rational, is not omniscient.

The

government can predict how it would react (under rational choice theory).
But the government cannot necessarily predict how bounded rational firms
and consumers behave under Scenario IV.291
One reason why predictions are harder under Scenario IV lies in the
unpredictability

of

the

non-price

dimensions

of

competition.

Heterogeneous bounded rational firms can have different degrees of success
in debiasing, learning and implementing knowledge into developing product
or process innovations, and responding to uncertainty and consumers’
changing tastes. Competitive dynamics can change in unforeseen ways, as
bounded rational firms attempt to accommodate and adjust to changing
consumer preferences.292

The success of those adjustments and

accommodations, in turn, can depend on further changes by private and

290

LEE BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST AND WIDE-OPEN 119 (2010).
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public institutions.293
Our knowledge of future events ranges from ignorance, uncertainty,
risk, to certainty. “If the underlying reality of the markets is constantly
changing, statistical models based on past data will be of limited use, at
best, in determining what is likely to happen in the future.”294 Economic
life is an adventure, but not necessarily a roller coaster. Waking up
tomorrow, I would not expect the value of the U.S. stock market to lose
about $1.2 trillion, my employer to close its doors, or my country to default
on its debt. But Black Swan events, Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes, carry
an extreme impact and are outside the realm of regular expectations,
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility.
Despite the events’ outlier status, the bounded rational market participants
concoct explanations for their occurrence after the fact to make them
explainable and predictable.295
Even for non-Black Swan events, like the price of bagels, competition
can be viewed under Scenarios I and IV. I expect my bagel shop tomorrow
to have the same assortment of bagels (plain, onion, poppy seed, etc.) and
prices as today. Consumer preferences should not change dramatically
overnight. The price, variety, and quality of bagels should not fluctuate
wildly (e.g., $2 gourmet bagels on Thursday and seventy-cent plain bagels
on Friday). But my comfort level decreases when trying to forecast bagel
prices over a larger geographic area over a longer time period. The risk
factors for the bagel industry, according to one public company, include (i)
changes in general economic conditions and discretionary consumer
spending, particularly spending for meals prepared away from home, (ii)

293

See, e.g., NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 116-26.
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changes in consumer tastes and preferences, through new diet fads (e.g.,
low-carbohydrate diets) or government regulations (e.g., the prominent
disclosure of nutritional and calorie information), (iii) food safety and
reputation for quality, (iv) volatile commodity prices, (v) weather
conditions (including natural disasters),296 and (vi) a regional or global
health pandemic, which could severely affect bagel businesses that position
themselves as a “neighborhood atmosphere” where “people can gather for
human connection and high quality food.”297 So if bagel manufacturers
face challenges in predicting and satisfying consumer preferences over the
coming years, so too will competition authorities when predicting
competitive effects in that industry.
Adding to the uncertainty under Scenario IV is path dependency.
Private and government agents’ prior choices and historical experiences can
constrain the current choice set.298 A seemingly minor event that happened
yesterday in the market can have significant long-term consequences.299
Some industries, like evolutionary processes generally, are characterized by
a degree of persistence of random events. “Rather than being additive to a
deterministic equilibrium, small random events in evolutionary processes
may accumulate into larger factors that may change the nature of the system
and its history.”300 Under an evolutionary economic process, “chance plays
a significant role.”301
One example is the rise of Microsoft. In the late 1960s, IBM controlled
296

Form 10-K, Einstein Noah Restaurant Group Inc – Bagl, filed Feb. 25, 2010
(period: Dec. 29, 2009).
297
Id.
298
NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 52; TAWNEY, supra note 266, at 28
(observing how revolutions “are apt to take their color from the regime which they
overthrow”).
299
Verspagen, supra note 249, at 6; see also Frank Schweitzer et al., Economic
Networks: The New Challenges, SCIENCE, July 24, 2009, at 422, 423.
300
Verspagen, supra note 249, at 4.
301
Id. at 6; Schweitzer et al., supra note 299, at 423.

RECONSIDERING COMPETITION

70

[16-Sep-11

about 70 percent of the computer market. The DOJ challenged IBM’s
practices, particularly its “bundling” hardware and software. During the
course of antitrust litigation, IBM changed course.

“Precipitated by a

massive antitrust complaint filed against IBM by the Justice Department in
January 1969, the company reexamined its practices and decided to stop
requiring customers to buy software, services, and hardware as one bundle
in June of the same year. This pricing change opened up software markets
to independent companies.”302 This contributed to the development of the
computer software industry. A decade later, when preparing to launch its
personal computers, the still dominant IBM approached a start-up company
Microsoft about creating a version of a BASIC computer program.
Microsoft suggested that IBM talk to Digital Research, whose CP/M
operating system had become the standard for computer hobbyists. But
here emotion apparently had a lasting impact. Digital Research’s president
reportedly disliked the arrogant IBM from his university days and was late
in meeting the IBM executives (going flying earlier that day). After the
negotiations stalled, IBM returned to Microsoft to create an operating
system for its personal computer. When introducing its PC, IBM sold the
Microsoft operating system for a much lower price than the CP/M-86
system.303 One could inquire what would have happened if the DOJ never
brought its antitrust suit against IBM or if Digital Research’s president had
not gone flying that day.
Another factor is how randomness interplays with predictability in

302

R. Lougee-Heimer, The Common Optimization INterface for Operations Research:
Promoting Open-Source Software in the Operations Research Community, 47 IBM J. RES.
& DEV. 57, 59 (2003) (citing THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., FATHER, SON & CO.: MY LIFE AT
IBM & BEYOND (1990)).
303
See ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH 326–27 (2006); Classic
ScobleShow, http://www.podtech.net/scobleshow/technology/1593/ (Aug. 8, 2007, 09:34
EST).
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scale-free networks.304 Scale-free networks are open. They expand through
the continuous addition of new members to the system, and they exhibit
preferential connectivity, “in that the probability with which a new vertex
connects to the existing vertices is not uniform, but there is a higher
probability to be linked to a vertex that already has a large number of
connections.”305

To illustrate this, suppose three antitrust professors--

Amelia, Beatrice, and Clara--start their careers at similar law schools and
their scholarship objectively is of similar quality. The three professors form
links (say collaborate on research projects) with one another. Their network
expands with each new antitrust law professor.

Each new antitrust

professor must decide with which existing antitrust professor to collaborate.
The new professors exhibit preferential connectivity, in that they generally
prefer to link with more connected professors. Thus with Amelia, Beatrice,
and Clara, the early rounds are more random: the new antitrust professor
Daniela can decide to link with Amelia, Beatrice, or Clara.

Suppose

Daniela randomly decides to collaborate with Amelia and Clara. Now
when new antitrust professor Eitel decides to collaborate, Amelia and Clara
have an advantage over Beatrice. Thus, Amelia and Clara will grow in the
number of links, as Beatrice lags behind. As Professor Barabási observed
with scale-free networks, the rich get richer.306 The highly connected nodes
(law professors Amelia and Clara in our example) acquire more links than
the less connected nodes (e.g., Professor Beatrice), which leads to the
emergence of a few highly connected nodes that become the main hubs for
collaboration. Thus, in scale-free networks, one must view the entire
process. If one only examines the network half-way through its formation,
304

Albert-László Barabási & Réka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks,
SCIENCE 286, 509 (1999).
305
Id. at 509.
306
Albert-László Barabási, Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond, SCIENCE, 24
July 2009, 412.
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one might assume that the well-connected antitrust professors were
attracting more links because they were better scholars. By then Amelia
and Clara might be better scholars (due to the experience of collaboration
and receiving as a result more information of current trends). But they
reached that success through an element of luck in the beginning. Likewise,
in examining the network only at its formation, one might assume that the
market was contestable as each professor had an equal chance of attracting
the next link.
2. Scenario IV’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Bounded
Rational
As in Scenarios II and III, the bounded rational government,
overconfident in the market participants’ rationality and willpower, may
assume that market forces generally will yield optimal outcomes.307 Indeed
regulatory capture is most effective when bounded rational regulators’
“share the worldview and the preferences of the industry they supervise.”308
This was the case with deregulation of the financial services industry, which
began during the Reagan administration,309 and accelerated under the
Clinton310 and Bush311 administrations.

One underlying force to this

deregulatory movement was the flawed laissez-faire belief that markets
were composed of sophisticated investors, and the markets accordingly
generally self-correct.312
307

CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 268-69 (recounting Federal Reserve’s belief that
advances in technology have enabled industry to better manage the hazards of their
business).
308
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309
Id. at 70-74.
310
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311
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312
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A second policy risk is that the bounded rational government,
overconfident in its ability to predict the likely competitive effects of
mergers, has little incentive or desire to assess the predictive quality of its
economic models.313 Here the government, unlike bounded rational firms,
fails to recognize that its knowledge depreciates in value over time.
Competition officials remain wedded to theories, the premises of which are
by now invalid. The government, for example, assumes that its economic
models still capture the key variables and that the market dynamics remain
largely unchanged since it last investigated the industry.

Antitrust’s

economic models mostly seek to reduce uncertainty, with the outcomes
largely based on the validity of the models’ assumptions. Implicit in much
of current economic theory is that one can accurately predict the future from
past experiences (as reflected in the data).314 Over the past two decades,
antitrust enforcers have increasingly harnessed the increase in available
market data to conduct merger simulations.315

Generally, with this

http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=693; Paul Krugman, How Did
Economists Get It So Wrong?,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at 37 (noting that more
important than the economists’ failure to predict was “the profession’s blindness to the
very possibility of catastrophic failures in the market economy”). Thus deregulating
derivatives, under this flawed worldview, could only reduce, not increase, systemic risk.
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Exchange
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313
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314
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Horizontal Merger Analysis 5 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No.
246, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp246.pdf (discussing use of scanner data
for demand estimation); David Scheffman & Mary Coleman, FTC Perspectives on the Use
of Econometric Analyses in Antitrust Cases 9 (undated) (draft document), http://
www.ftc.gov/be/ftcperspectivesoneconometrics.pdf (discussing the use of scanner data for
demand estimation and other relevant economic analyses); David Scheffman, Best
Practices for Data, and Economics and Financial Analyses in Antitrust Investigations (Apr.
2002) (unpublished manuscript), http:// www.ftc.gov/be/ftcbebp.pdf (providing guidelines
on economic analysis for meeting with FTC Bureau of Economics); see also Fed. Trade
Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6, 8, 9,
14 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf (describing use of scan
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economic modeling, the narrower the product category and geographic area
studied, the shorter the time horizon, the less likely that contingencies and
random factors will play a material role in making outcomes
indeterminate.316 But one recent survey identified several limitations in the
current economic models, including the lack of data availability in some
industries, the assumptions in the models, and the models’ neglect of nonquantifiable and long-run competitive effects, including the merger’s impact
on innovation.317

While merger simulations can help inform antitrust

analysis, the U.S. antitrust agencies wisely “do not treat merger simulation
evidence as conclusive in itself.”318 With the rise of global trade, we are
trending toward greater uncertainty, where contingencies or unforeseen
factors across the globe (e.g., a string of worker suicides in Foxconn’s
factory in Shenzhen, China) can affect domestic competitors (like Apple)
that rely on low-cost labor.319
A third risk under Scenario IV is that the bounded rational government
ignores non-quantifiable and long-run competitive effects, such as systemic
risks, and evidence which its economic theory cannot explain, such as
bounded rational behavior.320 The financial industry during the 1990s and

316
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early 2000s underwent a wave of mega-mergers.321 As a DOJ official
noted, “a number of individual mergers during the 1990's ranked among the
largest U.S. bank mergers ever, in terms of the real value of assets involved,
and in terms of the share of total U.S. bank assets accounted for by the
merging banks.”322 The financial sector was becoming more concentrated,
and its profits were growing faster.323 One mega-merger in the financial
services industry was the $70 billion merger of Travelers Group Inc. and
Citicorp, which created the world’s largest commercial banking
organization, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751
billion.324 During its merger review, the DOJ “heard numerous complaints
that Citigroup would have an undue aggregation of resources—that the deal
would create a firm too big to be allowed to fail.”325

But the DOJ

“essentially viewed this as primarily a regulatory issue to be considered by
the [Federal Reserve Board].”326 Despite the merger wave among large
financial institutions, the DOJ never really considered systemic risk or how
creating a firm too big to fail could distort competition. Instead the DOJ
limited its risk analysis as to whether Citicorp-Travelers, post-merger, could
raise price in narrowly defined geographic markets. So if a dominant bank
in the western United States merges with a dominant bank in the eastern
321

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 85. J.P. Morgan Chase, for example, was the
result of mergers with Chemical Bank and Manufacturers Hanover (1991), First Chicago
and National Bank of Detroit (1995), Chemical and Chase Manhattan (1996), Bank One
and First Chicago (1998), J.P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan (2000) and JPMorgan Chase
and Bank One (2004).
322
Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
“Mega-Mergers” in the Banking Industry (Apr. 14, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf.
323
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 85.
324
Federal Reserve Board, Travelers Group, Inc. and Citicorp, Order Approving
Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, 84
FED. RES. BULL. 985, at 4 (Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order],
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/BHC/1998/19980923/19980923.pdf.
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United States, the merger, in theory, should pose little antitrust risk, as they
operated in separate geographic markets.327 In limiting its risk assessment
to short-term price effects (e.g., banks’ ability post-merger to raise rates for
specific categories of borrowers) in narrowly-defined geographic markets,
the bounded rational government can fail to see or assess the merger’s
impact on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the overall
financial system.
The financial markets, when viewed as a complex adaptive system, can
become more vulnerable as one bank increases in size and becomes too-bigto-fail.328 This is not always apparent. During relatively calm periods,
having large financial institutions can appear beneficial. If a peripheral
bank is subject to a random shock, the network’s health remains stable.
Indeed, the larger banks may be credited for absorbing the shock.329 “It is
only when the hub–a large or connected financial institution--is subject to
stress that network dynamics will be properly unearthed,” said a Bank of
England executive. “When large financial institutions came under stress
during this crisis, these adverse system-wide network dynamics revealed
themselves.”330
Even if the bounded rational government acknowledges systemic risks,
327

Id. at 7 (noting how the NationsBank and Bank of America mega-merger “was a
classic market extension merger since NationsBank's operations focused generally on the
east coast and south and Bank of America was largely on the west coast” so the merger’s
competitive issues for the DOJ involved only two states—New Mexico and Texas).
328
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of
the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology and Ethics to Structural
and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (an evolutionary
biology perspective on why large economic concentrations, such as monopolies and
oligopolies, are vastly overrated in terms of their overall efficiency and positive impacts on
our economic system, and how the Chicago School underrates their dangerous impacts),
available at http://works.bepress.com/thomas_horton/1Horton.
329
CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 283 (recounting Greenspan’s praise of large
systemically important banks’ use credit derivatives to stabilize banking system)
330
Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England,
Rethinking The Financial Network, Speech delivered at the Financial Student Association,
(Apr. 2009), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf
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the risks are often harder to quantify and thus easier to ignore. Under a total
welfare analysis, the competition authority assesses a merger’s risks (and
costs) over the short-term (including its impact on consumer and producer
surplus) and long-term (including its effect on the network’s resilience).331
Assessing the merger’s short-term static price effects (e.g., whether the
banks post-merger can raise rates for specific categories of borrowers) is
often easier than assessing and quantifying the merger’s long-term impact
on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the overall financial
network. But if the government ignores the mega-merger’s risks to the
overall financial network’s resilience, then the merger analysis is
incomplete and potentially flawed.

This risk is compounded when the

bounded rational government, overconfident that its merger analysis
identifies all the significant anticompetitive risks, quickly approves megamergers that are viewed as market extensions (despite the long-term risks
these mergers may pose), and seeks to dismantle any restraints on future
industry concentration.332
A fourth risk under Scenario IV is when a bounded rational government
331

Howard A. Shelanski, Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 229, 239-45 (2010); Sally J. Goerner et al., Quantifying Economic
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ECOLOGICAL ECON. 76, 77 (2009).
332
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not to consider the proposal unless and until Congress amends the law to allow unlimited
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Order, supra note 324, at 6. Travelers CEO Sanford Weill hoped his mega-merger would
push Congress to remove the barriers under the Glass-Steagall Act. The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer: Financial Powerhouse (PBS television broadcast Apr. 7, 1998), transcript
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available
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is overconfident in its ability to regulate firms deemed too big to fail. For
example, commenters warned the Federal Reserve Board that the CiticorpTravelers mega-merger “would result in an undue concentration of
resources and in an organization that is both ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to
supervise.’”333 But in permitting the merger, the Federal Reserve responded
the nation’s largest corporate merger “would have a de minimis effect on
competition.”334

The Federal Reserve rejected the argument that the

absolute or relative size of Citicorp would adversely affect the market
structure.335 It failed to see how “the size or breadth of Citicorp's activities
would allow it to distort or dominate any relevant market.”336 Finally, the
Federal Reserve, with its “extensive experience supervising Citicorp,”
confidently stated that it “developed a comprehensive, risk-based
supervision plan” to effectively monitor Citibank; moreover other
government agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, would
“assist the Board in understanding Citigroup's business and the risk profiles
of those businesses.”337
As the merger played out over the next decade, Citigroup senior
management and the government demonstrated their poor understanding of
the risk profiles of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) business.338 In
2008, Citibank, and other financial institutions considered too-big-to-fail,

333
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335
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337
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were (or were perceived to be) failing and received an implicit government
guarantee. Citigroup, an early recipient of the government bailout, received
a $45 billion emergency infusion and $301 billion of government asset
insurance, which was the largest taxpayer bailout for any U.S. bank.339
3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario IV
Given Scenario IV’s competitive dynamics, one could argue that the
government cannot accurately predict the merger’s likely competitive
effects. Accordingly, the government should abstain from predictions and
challenge

only

those

consummated

mergers

where

significant

anticompetitive effects have manifested.340 But waiting post-merger for
anticompetitive effects can foreclose effective relief (one reason why
Congress facilitated pre-merger review).341
Moreover bounded rationality differs from ignorance.
problems are apparent.

At times the

One need not be a Homo Economicus to see

America’s obesity problem. A bounded rational government can assist
339

Pro Publica Inc., Where is the Money?: Eye on the Bailout
http://bailout.propublica.org/entities/96-citigroup; Keoun et al., supra note 338; CASSIDY,
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assets).
340
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consumers’, firms’ and its own learning processes by improving the
feedback loop. The government can disseminate information of market
participants’ trial-and-error experiments, and assist participants in
integrating and applying that knowledge. Advances in telecommunications,
for example, have helped farmers in India to not only learn the latest crop
prices but to also increase their yields and efficiencies by learning from
researchers’ and other farmers’ lessons through trial-and-error. Farmers use
cell phones to learn how to use less seed, fuel, and fertilizers, while reaping
bigger harvests.342
The government can also opt for structural safeguards to promote
industry diversity. On the one hand, systemic risk is not limited to highly
concentrated markets dominated by firms too big to fail. Small bounded
rational banks can similarly ignore their activities’ riskiness.343 Several
bank failures can have a cascading effect, when banks respond similarly to
cripple the banking system.344 On the other hand, a larger, more diverse
pool, while susceptible to herding, “leads to a higher probability that in the
case of an exogenous shock one of these technologies will provide an
appropriate solution.”345

Consequently perhaps the best recipe for

confronting uncertainty and systematic risk is maintaining diversity and
“institutions that permit trial and error experiments to occur.”346
Ultimately, the key operating issue under Scenario IV is one of
institutional design. Do the government institutions have sufficient
incentives to recognize their bounded rationality, to continually learn and
342

Richard Stone, News: Dialing Up Knowledge—And Harvests, SCIENCE, Feb. 12,
2010, at 808.
343
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price over the short-term.
344
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346
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2006) (unconcentrated markets reduce the risk of costly error).
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update their beliefs, and to update their policies accordingly?
One impediment to this trial-and-error feedback loop is the behavioral
bias of belief perseverance, whereby one holds one’s views notwithstanding
disconfirming evidence.

Confident in the predictive quality of its

competition policies, the government may argue that there is no need to
empirically test whether its predictions are indeed accurate; it also ignores
or discounts competitive behavior that its economic theories cannot explain.
A second impediment is incentives. Bounded rational firms at least
have an incentive to improve their rationality and willpower when debiasing
provides a competitive advantage. The government lacks this incentive. At
times competition agencies compete for prestige, resources, and cases (such
as the FTC and DOJ over mergers). But inter-agency competition does not
necessarily increase political accountability that reduces biases and
heuristics.347 The competition agency may attract dynamic leaders with a
desire to critically test the economic theory’s assumptions. But others in
government may resist diverting funding from immediate prosecutions,
which provide publicity and justification for existence. The rewards from
institutional learning accrue over the long-term, often after the political
appointees leave office. Moreover, economic experts and lawyers whose
livelihood depends on rational choice theory (and firms that benefit from
these antitrust policies) will discourage such empiricism as a waste of time
and resources. Consequently market forces will not necessarily provide
government institutions sufficient incentives to recognize their bounded
rationality, to continually test their assumptions, to retrospectively examine
the efficacy of their actions, and to use these findings to update their

347

When test subjects were expected to defend their judgments to their peers, subjects
chose more complex and time-consuming decision-making strategies. Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 480, 481(1990).
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policies.348
Consequently, competition agencies need patient gardeners, who
experiment, monitor, and update the economic theories. To enable these
gardeners to tend to antitrust policy, structural mechanisms are needed to
increase the government’s incentives to debias.

One mechanism is to

increase the government’s accountability. This can be done directly, as in
the E.U., where the European Commission’s inaction (e.g., not enjoining a
merger) can be challenged in court. But this assumes that the court will
strike the right balance in deference. A second mechanism is to require the
competition agencies to explain why they did not challenge mergers, subject
to extended review.349 The competition agency should explain each critical
assumption it made in determining that the merger was unlikely to lessen
competition. This, in turn, can be tested, by requiring the agencies to
undertake and publish more post-merger reviews. Moreover, if the agency
believed that the merger is anticompetitive, but felt based on the evidence it
would lose in court, the agency should say so. Otherwise the courts and
Congress will be unaware of the unintended consequences the current case
law is causing. At times enforcement actions lead to undesirable outcomes.
High criminal fines can hamper competition. Divestitures of assets, as part
of merger review, may later prove inadequate. Behavioral remedies may
unintentionally lead to anticompetitive results.350 By subjecting the
348
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competition agencies' actions to external review and criticism, such ex post
review would require greater accountability by those entrusted with
enforcing the antitrust laws. The government can require its competition
authorities to periodically commission empirical research to test the
continuing validity of the assumptions underlying their policies.

The

government agencies “have the ability to study over time how individuals
behave in certain settings,”351 which is exactly what the U.K.’s Office of
Fair Trading is doing with pricing frames.352
CONCLUSION
To design better competition policies, we need to understand the limits
of our current policies. Thus, as the Chicago School recognized, defining
competition and the goals of competition law are paramount.
because “[e]verything else follows from the answer we give.”

This is
353

Going

forward, competition authorities must first reevaluate their theory of
competition.

As this Article shows, no satisfactory definition of

competition exists. Some consider competition as an idealized end state
(such as static price competition under the economic model of perfect
competition); others view competition as a dynamic process.
As this Article shows, any theory of competition will depend on its
premises.

Altering one set of assumptions (rationality of firms and

consumers) expands the current theories of competition into the frontiers of
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352
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353
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protection of fragmented markets, Bork settled on his definition of competition, namely as
“a shorthand of expression of consumer welfare,” which in turn comported with his goal of
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Scenarios II, III, and IV. Altering the assumption of the government’s
relative rationality adds additional policy concerns.
One cannot understand competition deductively from the assumption of
rational market participants with perfect willpower. Nor can one assume
that every market is confined to one scenario. In markets with sophisticated
participants dealing in homogenous goods where price rather than
innovation is key, competition can resemble Scenario I. Other markets can
resemble Scenario IV, where “competition is a method for solving
knowledge problems through a trial and error process.”354

Nor are

industries confined to one scenario. Industries can originate in Scenario IV
when uncertainty exists over consumers’ preferences and how the new
technology benefits consumers.355 Various experimental designs are at play
until through trial-and-error (or network effects) a dominant design
emerges.

As the industry matures, consumers and manufacturers

experiment less, variety decreases, and competition turns more on price.356
Competition is better understood inductively through empirical
research. In analyzing competition under the frontiers of Scenarios II, III,
and IV, policymakers will see beyond static price competition in narrowlydefined antitrust markets. Issues of systemic risk, behavioral exploitation,
herding behavior, and overconfidence bias will increase in importance.
Antitrust analysis accordingly will shift from narrowly-defined markets to
vertical and horizontal competition among larger units, systems, platforms,
alliances, in which potential competition plays an important analytical role.
Going forward, there will unlikely be any unifying definition of
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competition. Competition, like any complex system, is incompressible, in
that it is “impossible to account for the system in a manner that is less
complex than the system itself.”357 Once policymakers relax the premises
of their theories of competition, they will encounter greater complexity.
They will increasingly perceive competition as an often unpredictable,
dynamic process, not easily subject to mathematical modeling.
One might ask whether defining competition, given the complexities, is
necessary. But one cannot understand what goals are achievable from a
competition policy, unless one better comprehends how competition works.
And one cannot understand competition, if one relies on a flawed
assumption of rationality.
Consequently, the first order is to understand how competition works in
particular industries and to reevaluate the premises of our theory of
competition, including the rationality of the market participants and the
interplay among government institutions and informal social, ethical, and
moral norms.

Although competition agencies are increasingly sharing

market studies,358 this remains competition policy’s weakness.359
In revisiting their theory of competition, including the underlying
assumptions, competition authorities should look beyond antitrust’s current
neo-classical economic theories, and consider the developments in several
inter-disciplinary fields, such as behavioral economics, new institutional
economics, and evolutionary economics. The literature can provide a richer
understanding of the observed marketplace behavior, how consumers
choose, and additional remedial options, including default options.
357
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Ultimately, these interdisciplinary economic theories can improve antitrust
analysis by helping us understand first what competition is, second what
competition can achieve for us, and third how competition can promote the
good life.

